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Abstract 
I investigate the determinants and economic consequences associated with firms’ 
financial reporting choices. Recognizing the endogeneity associated with these choices, I 
find evidence of a positive association between investors’ demands for firm-specific 
information and financial reporting quality. I also find that higher proprietary costs are 
associated with a lower quality of financial information. As for the economic 
consequences, the evidence suggests that firms with high quality financial reporting 
policies have reduced information asymmetries. However, after accounting for the 
endogeneity associated with the reporting quality choice, I find no significant evidence 
that firms choosing to provide financial information of higher quality enjoy a lower cost 
of equity capital. These results demonstrate the importance of explicitly modeling the 
endogeneity of financial reporting choices in investigating the associated economic 
consequences. 
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1. Introduction 
I investigate the determinants and economic consequences of cross-sectional variation 
in firms’ choices concerning the quality of their financial reporting. While the quality of 
financial reporting may be judged from a number of perspectives (e.g., earnings 
persistence, predictability of future performance, earnings variability, the relation 
between cash, accruals and income), I focus on how reported accounting numbers 
accurately represent the underlying economic fundamentals of the firm.  Specifically, I 
define high-quality reported earnings as those that are highly associated with future 
operating cash flows.1 This focus is motivated by the objectives of the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), as reflected in its Statement of Financial Concepts 
No. 1, Objectives of Financial Reporting by Business Enterprises [1978], paragraphs 37-
39 and 44.2 
Economic theory suggests that, ceteris paribus, increasing the quality of financial 
information reduces information asymmetries and hence lowers the cost of capital (e.g., 
Amihud and Mendelson [1986], Diamond and Verrecchia [1991], Easley and O’Hara 
[2003], and Glosten and Milgrom [1985]). A firm can reduce information asymmetries 
between itself and market participants and between informed and uninformed investors 
by providing information that help investors in their decision making process. Consistent 
with these theoretical models, empirical studies using indirect measures of disclosure 
document that a firm’s disclosure quality/level is positively associated with capital 
market valuation benefits (Welker [1995], Healy et al. [1999]), and, in particular, is 
inversely related to its cost of capital (e.g., Botosan [1997], Botosan and Plumlee [2002]). 
Using more direct measures of accounting information quality, recent empirical work 
focuses on the association between earnings quality and the cost of capital (e.g., Barone 
[2002], Barth and Landsman [2003], Bhattacharya, Daouk and Welker [2003], and 
Francis et al. [2003a, 2003b]). 
However, in spite of the valuation benefits providing high-quality financial 
information affords, many firms decide against the maximum reporting quality. This 
                                                 
1 This is consistent with the definition of earnings quality in Mikhail et al. [2003]. They define it as: “the extent to 
which a firm’s past earnings are associated with its future operating cash flows.” 
2 Paragraph 37 states: “…[F]inancial reporting should provide information to help present and potential investors and 
creditors and other users in assessing the amounts, timing, and uncertainty of prospective cash receipts…..Thus, 
financial reporting should provide information to help investors, creditors, and others assess the amounts, timing, and 
uncertainty of prospective net cash inflows to the related enterprise.” Paragraph 44 states: “[I]nformation about 
enterprise earnings and its components measured by accrual accounting generally provides a better indication of 
enterprise performance than information about current cash receipts and payments.” 
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decision likely reflects the potential costs associated with disseminating high-quality 
information (see Fields et al. [2001] for a discussion). For instance, high-quality financial 
information, if it is characterized as proprietary, can result in competitive disadvantages 
in a firm’s product market. Firms are thus likely to consider the potential liabilities of 
providing high-quality financial reports when choosing an optimal level of 
informativeness in their financial statements. Such considerations make it difficult to 
interpret the association of high-quality reporting with capital market valuation benefits 
documented in prior research.  
A significant shortcoming of numerous empirical disclosure studies is the failure to 
address the endogenous nature of the disclosure quality decision. If researchers do not 
control for the determinants of disclosure policy, their inferences regarding the economic 
consequences of disclosure quality may be spurious (Fields et. al [2001], Core [2001]). 
The research design used in this study specifically addresses these concerns by 
accounting for the endogenous nature of the financial reporting decision. In particular, 
this study identifies the factors that determine the variation in financial reporting quality 
choices and the associated economic consequences.   
While economic theory that relates the quality of accounting information and the 
potential valuation benefits and proprietary costs is compelling, empirical evidence 
supporting the theory is scarce (see the survey article by Healy and Palepu [2001]).  For 
example, Piotroski [2003] investigates both the proprietary costs and valuation benefits 
associated with managers’ financial reporting decisions. Piotroski focuses only on a 
specific facet of the overall financial reporting policy, namely the segment reporting 
choice. My primary objective is to better understand the determinants and consequences 
of a broader aspect of a firm’s financial reporting policy, as evidenced by the quality of 
financial reporting it chooses. 
I find evidence that higher investors’ demands for firm-specific information are 
associated with higher quality of financial reporting. In addition, the results suggest that 
higher proprietary costs are associated with lower quality of financial information. My 
findings also indicate that firms with high-quality financial reporting policies have lower 
information asymmetries (as proxied by bid-ask spreads), lower uncertainty, and lower 
estimation risk (as reflected in lower analyst forecast dispersion and higher analyst 
following). However, I do not find evidence that firms choosing to provide high-quality 
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financial information necessarily enjoy a lower cost of equity capital. This result conflicts 
with the results of prior research (e.g., Barone [2002] and Francis et. al [2003a]).3 My 
evidence suggests that the link found in previous research between a firm’s quality of 
accounting information and its cost of capital results from a failure to consider factors 
determining the quality of financial reporting chosen by the reporting firm. My analysis 
implies that the information risk associated with the quality of financial reporting does 
not necessarily constitute an additional risk factor, but rather is a firm-specific 
uncertainty characteristic. This finding suggests that capital market participants are not 
likely to price the documented uncertainty as other risk factors, such as beta, size and 
book-to-market ratios. In other words the information risk associated with financial 
reporting quality choice is an idiosyncratic risk factor rather than a systematic one priced 
by investors.4 
This study contributes to the existing accounting literature in several ways. Its main 
contribution is that it accounts for the endogenous character of firms’ decision about the 
quality of their financial reporting. I show that the failure to address this endogeneity 
affects the inferences made and conclusions drawn by previous studies. Next, responding 
to concerns about certain empirical measures of disclosure quality (e.g. Healy and Palepu 
[2001]), I introduce a new measure of reporting quality which can be used in more 
general research settings for broad samples of firms. Finally, this study’s findings have 
important implications for research on the consequences of firms’ disclosure policies. 
The evidence I present suggests that the variation in financial reporting quality depends 
not only on the benefits firms expect to derive from disclosure, but also on the proprietary 
costs firms face. Future work on determinants and consequences of financial reporting 
policies should thus consider both the costs and benefits associated with a reporting 
policy choice. 
                                                 
3 Recent empirical studies which investigate the association between earnings quality (and other earnings attributes) 
and the cost of capital treat earnings quality as an exogenous variable (e.g., Barone [2002], Barth and Landsman 
[2003], and Francis et al. [2003a]). Therefore, these studies ignore any discretionary aspect associated with the choice 
of the quality of reported earnings. In concurrent work, Francis et al. [2003b] distinguish between non-discretionary 
and discretionary components of accruals quality and find that the discretionary component has a significantly lower 
pricing effect on the cost of capital. Moreover, they find that the discretionary accruals component is both smaller and 
in general less statistically significant than the cost of capital effect of the non-discretionary component. I discuss these 
results in Section 4. 
4 As a robustness check, I validate my empirical reporting quality measure with an earnings quality measure introduced 
by Dechow and Dichev [2002]. The tenor and significance of the reported results is unchanged under this alternative 
specification. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature 
review and presents the theoretical background on the determinants and consequences 
associated with financial reporting decisions. Section 3 describes the research design and 
addresses methodological issues. Section 4 presents the sample selection criteria and 
discusses the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Relation to Prior Research  
Theoretical research investigating the link between disclosure and a firm’s cost of 
capital suggests a negative association between the two. The first stream of research 
arguing for this association concludes that firms with increased levels of disclosure 
reduce the cost of capital arising from information asymmetries, either between firms and 
its stockholders, or between potential traders in the firm’s shares. Examples of theoretical 
work in this area are Copeland and Galai [1983], Glosten and Milgrom [1985], and 
Diamond and Verrecchia [1991]. Diamond and Verrecchia [1991] suggest that higher 
disclosure reduces the amount of information revealed by a large trade in a firm’s 
securities, thereby reducing the negative price impact associated with such large trades. 
In this scenario investors would have relatively large positions in a particular firm’s 
securities. There would be a higher demand for the firm’s securities, which would 
increase the price of the firm’s stock, thereby reducing the cost of equity capital.   
 Empirical work by Amihud and Mendelson [1986] suggests that firms whose 
stocks have a higher bid-ask spread have a higher cost of equity capital because investors 
demand compensation for the added transaction costs. The authors contend that firms that 
provide more private information can reduce the adverse selection component of the bid-
ask spread, and thus reduce their cost of equity capital.  
A second stream of research focuses on the link between estimation risk and the 
cost of capital (e.g., Barry and Brown [1985]). This research suggests that a firm can 
reduce the estimation risk associated with its payoff distribution by providing more 
disclosures. If investors price the estimation risk, providing more information will reduce 
the firm’s cost of capital.  
In recent work Easley and O’Hara [2003] demonstrate a link between information 
structure (private versus public information) and the cost of capital. Developing a rational 
expectations asset pricing model, they argue that more private information increases the 
risk faced by uninformed investors since better informed investors can shift their 
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portfolio weights to adjust for new information. Easley and O’Hara [2003] imply that 
firms can affect their cost of capital through the precision and quantity of the information 
they provide investors.5 
One of the major limitations of empirical studies on corporate disclosures is the 
difficulty in measuring the quality of disclosure policies (Healy and Palepu [2001]).6 
Using the Association of Investment Management and Research (hereafter, AIMR) 
rankings as an indirect measure of disclosure quality, numerous empirical studies 
examine the association between these measures and firm characteristics and capital 
market valuation proxies (e.g., Lang and Lundholm [1993], Healy, Hutton, and Palepu 
[1999], and Welker [1995]). Lang and Lundholm [1993] find a positive association 
between the AIMR scores and firm size, firm performance, and security issues, and a 
negative association between the AIMR scores and the correlation between earnings and 
returns. Welker [1995] finds that firms with higher AIMR scores have lower information 
asymmetry, as proxied by bid-ask spreads. Healy, Hutton, and Palepu [1999] find that 
firms with sustained improvements in analysts’ ratings of disclosure quality (AIMR 
scores) show an increase in stock liquidity, analyst following, institutional ownership, 
and stock performance. 
Previous empirical research has documented mixed and limited evidence that 
disclosure reduces the cost of capital. Botosan [1997] finds that manufacturing firms with 
a low security analyst following have a negative association between a self-constructed 
index of disclosure level and the cost of equity capital. In a related empirical study 
Sengupta [1998] provides evidence that high disclosure ratings (AIMR) are inversely 
associated with the cost of debt. Botosan and Plumlee [2002] find a negative relation 
between the annual report disclosure level (as measured by the AIMR ratings) and the 
cost of capital. Yet they also document that the cost of capital is positively associated 
with the levels of disclosures in quarterly reports (this finding is contrary to the prediction 
of the theory). In a different context Leuz and Verrecchia [2000] show that German firms 
that adopt a high-quality reporting regime by switching to international reporting 
                                                 
5 Easley and O’Hara [2003, pg. 37] claim that “An important implication of our research is that firms can 
influence their cost of capital by affecting the precision and quantity of information available to investors. 
This can be accomplished by a firm’s selection of its accounting standards, as well as through its corporate 
disclosure policies.”   
6 The difficulty in measuring disclosure quality has led some researchers to focus on management forecasts 
(e.g., Coller and Yohn [1997], Pownall, Wasley, and Waymire [1993]). Others examine disclosure quality 
ratings, for example, Lang and Lundholm [1996], Healy, Hutton, and Palepu [1999], and Welker [1995]. 
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standards exhibit lower information asymmetry, as reflected by lower bid-ask spreads and 
higher trading volume. To summarize, empirical evidence on the relation between 
disclosures and the cost of capital generally suggests an inverse relation between the cost 
of capital and disclosures. 
A separate but complementary branch of analytical research examines the costs, 
especially the proprietary ones, associated with disclosure decisions. Models such as Dye 
[1985b, 1986], Verrecchia [1983, 1990], Darrough and Stoughton [1990], Wagenhofer 
[1990], and Hayes and Lundholm [1996] argue that, all things being equal, the 
probability of disclosure decreases as the associated proprietary costs increase. Most of 
these proprietary costs borne by firms arise from interaction with other parties - the costs 
of competitive disadvantage from disclosing information to their competitors and 
regulators, of bargaining disadvantages with both suppliers and consumers, and of 
litigation that might follow informative disclosure are three such examples.7 
Wagenhofer [1990] provides a model investigating whether reducing the cost of 
capital (maximizing market value) offsets the adverse effects of increasing disclosures 
arising from potential entrants to the firm’s product market. Wagenhofer shows that 
although there is always a full-disclosure equilibrium, partial-disclosure equilibria may 
also exist. These depend on the information to be disclosed, the level of political costs, 
and the probability of a competitor entering the product market. Baiman and Verrecchia 
[1996] present a model that considers both the costs and benefits of disclosure, and show 
that a trade-off between the two forces exists. A higher level of disclosure reduces the 
cost of capital, but it also reduces the manager’s profits from inside trading. 
As Fields et al. [2001] suggest, the empirical evidence presented in studies like 
Botosan [1997] and Sengupta [1998]) provides interesting insights, but these studies 
suffer from noteworthy limitations. Most importantly, these studies do not consider the 
related costs of higher disclosure quality and whether these costs affect the disclosure 
decision. Firms measure the valuation benefits of providing higher quality earnings 
against the associated costs. If the proprietary costs outweigh the market valuation 
benefits, the firm will choose to provide a lower quality of reported earnings, which will 
                                                 
7 Other costs related to disclosure are the costs of developing and presenting financial information. These costs, which 
are non-proprietary, are of second-order effect. This study focuses only on third party related costs, which are assumed 
to be proprietary. 
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be less informative in predicting future performance. This strongly motivates my 
examination of the costs and benefits associated with disclosure policy choices. 
Recognizing the endogenous nature of the financial reporting quality choice, I 
first model the factors determining this choice. Focusing on these determinants, I test 
whether firms respond to investors’ demands for firm-specific information. Specifically, I 
examine whether firms with a more highly dispersed investor bases are likely to provide 
higher quality of financial information in response to investors’ information needs.  
Second, I test whether proprietary cost factors, measured by the level of competition 
within an industry, growth opportunities, and barriers to entry, affect the reporting 
decision. As for the economic effects of quality reporting choices, I test whether higher 
quality reporting is associated with a lower cost of capital. Furthermore, I examine 
whether lower levels of information asymmetries, lower uncertainty, and estimation risk 
are associated with higher quality reporting. I test in particular the association between 
the empirical measure of reporting quality and bid-ask spreads and analyst forecast 
characteristics (forecast dispersion and the number of analysts following a firm). 
3. Research Design      
 Firms’ financial reporting quality decisions are likely to be endogenous. If factors 
influencing cross-sectional variation in the reporting decision also influence the 
association between capital market valuation benefits and the quality of the reported 
accounting information, failing to control for the reporting choice may lead to erroneous 
inferences (Maddala [1983]). Specifically, an OLS regression of empirical measures for 
the identified capital markets valuation benefits on firm characteristics and a reporting 
quality measure would result in inconsistent and biased coefficients. To address this 
issue, I use a two-stage estimation method (Barnow et al. [1980], Maddala [1983, p.121], 
and Wooldridge [2002]; see Appendix A for a detailed discussion of the econometric 
specification). I first discuss my empirical measure of reporting quality and then address 
the factors determining the reporting choice and its economic consequences. 
3.1 Measurement of Financial Reporting Quality 
Consider the following simple setting: (i) Firms have an objective to maximize their 
expected value, (ii) At the end of period (t-1), firms release an audited annual earnings 
report. Aggregate earnings for period (t-1) and its components (cash flow from operations 
and accruals) are used by various parties (e.g., capital markets participants, customers, 
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suppliers, and current and potential competitors) to predict firms’ future cash flows at 
time t, (t+1), etc. 
 Analytical models (e.g., Admati and Pleiderer [2000], Baiman and Verrecchia 
[1996], and Easley and O’Hara [2003]) take the disclosed public information’s precision 
as the measure of its quality. The precision is interpreted as achieving a given level of 
predictability of expected future cash flows under the flexibility and discretion permitted 
by GAAP. Thus, the higher the precision, the higher the quality of reported earnings, and 
the more accurately future cash flows may be predicted. 
To measure the level of precision empirically, I focus on the residuals obtained 
from a regression of future operating cash flows on previous period earnings components. 
Following prior studies (Fairfield et al. [1996] and Barth et al. [2001]), I partition 
reported earnings into two main components: cash flow from operations and accruals. I 
base my measure of financial reporting quality on the residuals obtained from estimating 
the model specified in equation (1) using ordinary least squares: 
 
ε ++ +β+β+∆β+∆β+∆β+β+α= 1t,it,i6t,i5t,i4t,i3t,i2t,i101t,i OTHERDEPRAPINVARCFOCFO          (1) 
Where: 
 
CFO t,i   Cash flow from operations for firm i at year t (Compustat annual data   
  item #308) minus the accrual portion of extraordinary items and  
  discontinued operations per the statement of cash flows (Compustat  
  annual data item #124); 
AR t,i∆  Change in accounts receivable account per the statement of cash flows  
(Compustat  annual data item #302); 
INV t,i∆  Change in inventory account per the statement of cash flow (Compustat  
  annual data item #303); 
AP t,i∆   Change in accounts payable and accrued liabilities account per the 
statement of cash flows (Compustat annual data item #304); 
DEPR t,i  Depreciation and Amortization Expense (Compustat annual data item 
#125); 
OTHER t,i    Net of all other accruals, calculated as EARN – (CFO+∆AR+∆ INV- 
∆AP-DEPR), where EARN is income before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations (Compustat annual data item #18);8 
ε +1t,i   Error term assumed to have zero mean and constant variance. 
                                                 
8 If Compustat annual data items #302, #303, or #304 are missing, AR∆ , INV∆ , and AP∆  are calculated using data 
from the balance sheet, i.e., accounts receivable (Compustat annual data item #2), inventory (Compustat annual data 
item #3), and accounts payable (Compustat annual data item #70 plus accrued expenses (Compustat annual data item 
#153)). 
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All variables are deflated by average total assets. 
 Based on an accrual reporting system, the model estimated in equation (1) 
suggests that future operating cash flows are predicted by current disaggregated earnings. 
The evidence presented in Barth et al. [2001] emphasizes the importance of 
disaggregating accruals, given the different information each major accrual reflects about 
future cash flows. By focusing on aggregate earnings rather than on the specification 
identified in equation (1), one places the same weight on each earnings component, and 
may disregard any information relevant to predicting future cash flows.9 
 In order to obtain the financial reporting quality metric, I estimate equation (1) for 
each fiscal year t for each two-digit SIC industry code. I focus on the residuals obtained 
from estimating equation (1). These provide a firm-specific residual for each fiscal year t. 
The empirical measure of reporting quality is the absolute value of these residuals: RES 
= |e| 1t,i + .
10 These residuals reflect the magnitude of future operating cash flows unrelated 
to current disaggregated earnings. In the empirical analysis that follows, I interpret lower 
absolute value as representing a higher quality of financial reporting, which corresponds 
to a higher level of cash flow predictability.  
3.2 Determinants of Financial Reporting Quality Choice 
The choice firms make about the quality of the financial information they report 
in their public financial statements reflects an analysis that weighs the expected benefits 
against the associated costs of disclosing high-quality information. Providing high-quality 
financial information is likely to reduce the information asymmetry between the firms 
and its investors, and to decrease agency costs. Given these benefits, one would expect 
firms to choose to provide the highest quality of financial information possible, absent 
any costs of disclosing such information. Thus, one would expect to observe a corner 
solution where the maximum reporting quality is chosen. In reality, this does not occur 
implying that there are costs associated with disclosure, such as direct costs (non-
proprietary), litigation costs, and proprietary costs. Given such costs, firms would select 
an interior solution to financial reporting quality. Therefore, when investigating the 
                                                 
9 This specification is used because it has the highest predictive ability compared to models that include multiple lags 
of cash flows from operations and accruals components (see Barth et al. [2001]). 
10 An alternative firm-year specific measure of reporting quality is the squared residual for that year.  The correlation 
between this measure and the absolute value of residuals used in the study is 0.881 (p-value< 0.0001) which suggest 
that these measures are highly correlated. The tenor of the results is very similar under this alternative specification. 
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factors that determine a firm’s reporting strategy decision, the associated costs must be 
considered. 
 To implement this approach, I estimate a Probit model that captures the effects of 
these factors and accounts for other variables that give rise to variation in financial 
reporting quality. Below I present the empirical model and outline the measures I use for 
firm-specific information demands, agency costs, and proprietary costs. A discussion of 
the control variables used in this Probit estimation follows my discussion of the model 
and measures. 
 In the first stage of the analysis, I estimate the following Probit model based on 
the variables discussed below: 
 
HERFCAPITALGROWTHOWNER*QUALITY t,i4t,i3t,i2t,i101t,i φ+φ+φ+φ+φ=+  
            ξ+φ+φ+φ+φ+φ +SIZESEG_NOCMARGINLEVERAGE t,i9t,i8t,i7 1t,it,it,i5 6            (2) 
Where: 
 
QUALITYi,t+1 1 if   QUALITY*>0                     ( |e| 1t,i + <Industry Median |e| 1t,i + ) 
and QUALITY = 0 otherwise; 11 
OWNER t,i  Natural log of the number of shareholders of firm i in year t (in thousands; 
Compustat annual data item #100) minus natural log of the median 
number of shareholders (in thousands) for the respective two-digit SIC 
code; 
GROWTH t,i  Current year’s growth in sales, calculated as net sales for year t  
  (Compustat annual data item #12) less net sales of year t-1, scaled by net  
  sales for year t-1; 
CAPITAL t,i   Net plant, property and equipment (Compustat annual data item #8)  
  divided by total assets (Compustat annual data item #6); 
HERF t,i  The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is calculated as the sum of squares of  
  market shares in the industry. ∑= =n 1i i 2]Ss[HERF , where si is the firm’s  
  sales and S is the sum of sales for all firms in the industry (defined by the  
  two-digit SIC code), and n is the number of firms in the industry; 
LEVERAGE t,i Long term debt (Compustat annual data item #9) plus debt in current  
  liabilities (Compustat annual data item #34) divided by total assets  
  (Compustat annual data item #6); 
MARGIN t,i  Gross margin percentage, calculated as the year t net sales (Compustat  
 annual data item #12) less cost of goods sold for the year (Compustat   
  annual data item #41), scaled by net sales;  
                                                 
11 Instead of observing QUALITY*, which is the firm’s net benefit of high quality financial reporting, I observe only a 
binary variable indicating the firm’s reporting choice compared to its’ industry peers. 
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OC t,i   Operating cycle for firm i at time t, measured in days as 
)360/COGS(
2/)INVINV(
)360/Sales(
2/)ARAR( 1tt1tt −− +++ , where AR is the firm’s accounts 
receivable, INV is the firm’s inventory, and COGS is the firm’s cost of 
goods sold; 
N_SEGi,t Number of two-digit SIC code industries that the firm is engaged in year t; 
SIZE t,i  Natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end of the fiscal year 
(year t), calculated as the closing price at fiscal year-end times the number 
of shares outstanding  at fiscal year-end (Compustat annual data item #199 
times Compustat annual data item #25); 
ξ +1t,i   Error term assumed to have zero mean and constant variance. 
 
 The dependent variable in the model equation (2) specifies is a firm-year specific 
measure based on estimating equation (1) for each year t for each industry as defined in 
the previous section. I estimate the choice model in equation (2) across both firms and 
time, resulting in a pooled cross-sectional and time-series specification. 
Firms have incentives to respond to investors’ demands for firm-specific 
information since reducing information asymmetries between the firm and its investors 
can lower their cost of capital (see the survey articles by Healy and Palepu [2001] and 
Verrecchia [2001]). External demands for firm-specific financial information are 
expected to vary with the level of ownership concentration. Higher potential information 
asymmetry, especially among investors, and demands for firm-specific information is 
expected for firms with a highly dispersed investor base. Therefore, outsiders’ demands 
for financial information from these firms is expected to be higher than for firms with 
high levels of ownership holdings. To capture the effect of ownership dispersion on the 
quality of financial reporting, I use the variable OWNER, which is the log of the number 
of shareholders of the firm adjusted by the log of the median number of shareholders in 
the firm’s two-digit SIC code.  
To proxy for the proprietary costs associated with the reporting decision, I use 
measures of firm’s capital intensity, growth opportunities, and characteristics of its 
product market. If a product market’s barriers to entry are relatively high, the associated 
proprietary costs of disclosure should be relatively low. High capital intensity is generally 
interpreted as a major barrier of entry (Piotroski [2003]). Therefore, capital intensity is 
thought to be positively associated with the quality of financial information.12 High entry 
                                                 
12 In examining the effects of proprietary costs in the context of segment disclosures, Piotroski [2003] uses capital 
intensity as a barrier to entry and shows that it is positively associated with the fineness of segment reporting. 
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costs to a market, as reflected by high capital requirements, create situations in which a 
large fraction of the capital costs are already sunk for incumbent firms, but are decision 
relevant to potential entrants. To capture the feature of capital intensity as a barrier to 
entry, I use the variable CAPITAL, which comprises net property, plant and equipment 
scaled by total assets.13 
 Another measure of proprietary costs relates to the firm’s growth opportunities. 
The more innovative a market is and the more and heavily it relies on intangible 
knowledge, the more a firm should invest to retain its unique status and preserve future 
opportunities. Given that these future opportunities are positively associated with 
proprietary costs, I use GROWTH, which I define as the current year’s percentage 
change in sales, as a proxy for future opportunities that the firm needs to protect. I expect 
that it will be negatively associated with the level of future cash flow predictability.  
The literature identifies existing competition in a firm’s product market as being 
associated with proprietary costs. Competition thus influences a firm’s disclosure 
decisions. However, theoretical predictions about the relation between product market 
competition and disclosure are mixed. Some models predict that more competition within 
the product markets increases disclosure. Darrough and Stoughton [1990], identifying an 
endogenous disclosure cost, show that current competitors might prevent future entry by 
providing more informative disclosures in more competitive industries. On the other 
hand, Verrecchia [1983], identifying an exogenous cost of disclosure, suggests that 
current competition in the product market discourages disclosures, and predicts that firms 
provide less informative disclosures in more competitive product markets . 
In order to account for product market competition, I measure the concentration 
rate of each industry using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. I calculate the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index as ∑= =n 1i i 2]Ss[HERF , where si  is the firm’s sales, S is the sum of sales 
for all firms in the industry (defined by the two-digit SIC code), 
S
si  is the market share of 
firm i, and n is the number of firms in the industry.14 This index accounts for the relative 
size and distribution of firms in a market. The index approaches zero when a market 
                                                 
13 As a sensitivity analysis, I repeated the analysis by using capital expenditures, a flow variable. The reported results 
are not affected by this change. 
14 One can argue that the Herfindhal-Hirshman Index is a good proxy of pre-entry competition in a particular industry. 
For example, in concentrated industries where barriers to entry are low, one can expect competition to increase within a 
short period of time. 
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consists of a large number of firms of relatively equal size (a situation that approximates 
perfect competition). The index increases both as the number of firms in the market 
decreases and as the disparity in size between those firms increases. The higher the index, 
the higher the potential for the exercise of market power.  
Given the different analytical models’ suggestions, I do not have a specific 
prediction about the association between the quality of financial information and the level 
of competition, as captured by the concentration ratio. On the one hand, higher 
concentration ratios proxy for monopoly rents, but on the other hand, this may be one 
reason why the industry is highly concentrated. Thus the concentration ratio is likely to 
be a proxy for high entry costs (high barriers to entry). However, if the concentration 
ratio is a good proxy for post-entry competition (consistent with Verrecchia [1983]), then 
one would expect a positive relation between financial reporting quality and the level of 
industry concentration. Such an expectation implies a negative relation between the level 
of competition within an industry and financial reporting quality. 
To address the difference between the arguments raised in Verrecchia [1983] and 
Darrough and Stoughton [1990], I include the variable MARGIN, defined as sales 
revenue net of cost of goods sold, scaled by net sales. More profitable firms with higher 
gross margins attract future competition and face higher threats of potential entrants. 
Thus the higher is the firm’s profitability, captured by its gross margin, the more is the 
proprietary cost of providing higher quality of financial information expected to be. 
Given the evidence in analytical models (e.g., Dye [1985a, 1986]) and empirical studies 
(e.g., Lang and Lundholm [1993]), which suggest that firm performance is positively 
associated with disclosure, I must append a caveat to this prediction. This argument 
biases against finding a negative relation between firm’s profitability and financial 
reporting quality. 
The presence of agency costs gives rise to a demand for monitoring, and the 
information a firm’s financial statements provide may be used to mitigate agency costs 
(Jensen and Meckling [1976]). Highly leveraged firms have higher agency costs and thus 
a greater demand for monitoring.15 Therefore, I predict reporting quality to vary with a 
firm’s capital structure (Leftwich et al. [1981]). If the financial information provided in 
the firm’s annual report is complementary to the monitoring information debt providers 
                                                 
15 Capital structure is an endogenous variable for the firm as well. To address this concern, the specification of equation 
(2) uses lagged values of the explanatory variables in contrast to a contemporaneous specification. 
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use, I expect more leveraged firms to provide financial information of higher quality. If 
debt providers use substitute information channels to acquire monitoring information, this 
will decrease the likelihood that the previously prediction relation holds true. I use the 
variable LEVERAGE, which is the firm’s total debt to total asset ratio, to capture this 
determinant on financial reporting quality. 
Control Variables: 
Differences across firms could influence the future performance and predictability 
of their future cash flows. Dechow, Kothari and Watts [1998] show that ability of 
earnings to predict future cash flows depends on the firm’s operating cash cycle. Dechow 
and Dichev [2002] claim that longer operating cycles induce more uncertainty, making 
accruals noisier and less helpful in predicting future cash flows. To control for the 
uncertainty associated with the operating environment of the firm, I include in equation 
(2) a proxy for the length of the operating cycle (OC), where OC = 
)360/COGS(
2/)INVINV(
)360/Sales(
2/)ARAR( 1tt1tt −− +++  (measured in days). The operating cycle variable captures 
variation in future cash flow predictability that is likely not predetermined. To further 
address how the complexity of the firm’s operating environment affects variation in 
information quality, I also include the number of line of businesses that a firm engages in 
(N_SEG). To further control for the firm’s informational environment, I include as a 
control variable the firm’s SIZE, defined as the natural logarithm of market capitalization 
at the end of the fiscal year. 
3.3 Economic Consequences of Financial Reporting Quality 
I use four proxies for capital market consequences of financial reporting quality as 
the dependent variables in the second stage estimation: 1) the firm’s cost of equity capital 
estimated using a model developed by Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth [2000], 2) the firm’s 
bid-ask spread (a proxy for the level of information asymmetry), 3) the dispersion in 
analysts’ earnings forecasts (a proxy for uncertainty and estimation risk), and 4) the 
number of analysts following the firm (a proxy for the informativeness of the firm’s 
information environment). The main hypothesis that I test is whether providing financial 
information of higher quality is associated with capital market valuation benefits. 
To test the economic consequences associated with reporting quality, I estimate 
the following pooled cross-sectional time-series model: 
 ε+β+β+α= t,it,i2it10t,i QUALITY'X'ESCONSEQUENC                               (3) 
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In equation (3) the dependent variable is one of the four proxies for capital market 
consequences, Xit represents a vector of control variables, and QUALITYi,t is an 
empirical measure of reporting quality. As discussed previously, QUALITY is likely to 
be correlated with the error termε , which creates an endogeneity problem. This 
endogeneity is generally due to omitted correlated variables. As shown in the previous 
section, financial reporting quality may be determined by factors that are not captured by 
the control vector X.  
This endogeneity problem can be solved through an instrumental variables 
approach. Following this approach, the researcher must identify a vector of observable 
variables that do not appear in equation (3) and are not correlated with the error termε , 
but are correlated in part with the variable QUALITY. The variables identified in section 
3.2 meet this requirement.  
I estimate a two-stage procedure (see Barnow, Cain, and Goldberger [1980] and 
Wooldridge [2002]), in the first stage of which I estimate a Probit financial reporting 
quality choice model. Using the fitted probabilities from this Probit model as an 
instrumental variable for the quality measure (FITQUALITY1), I estimate in the second 
stage an OLS regression of capital market/valuation benefits proxies on firm 
characteristics and this instrumental variable.16 Following Maddala [1983, p. 118-121], I 
do not include in the Probit model (equation (2)), a variable that proxies for any of the 
capital market benefits that I use in the second OLS regression. Including the dependent 
variable of the second stage equation in the Probit model will lead to a logically 
inconsistent specification, unless the capital market benefit coefficient is restricted to be 
equal to zero. It is important to note that the first stage Probit model need not be perfectly 
specified.17 All that is required is that the variables identified as determinants of the 
reporting quality choice and not appearing in the vector X in equation (3) be correlated 
with QUALITY. As the correlation matrix reported in Table 3 indicates, this is indeed the 
case.  
The use of a binary variable to measure reporting quality can introduce 
measurement error into the analysis, since such a variable may disregard valuable 
information. I address this concern by using a second instrumental variable 
                                                 
16 In order to derive correct inferences, the standard errors are adjusted to address the correlation between the error term 
of the probit selection model and the error term in the second stage equation (see Maddala [1983, p. 252-256]). 
17 See Wooldridge [2002, p. 623-624] for a detailed discussion and Appendix A. 
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(FITQUALITY2), obtained from an OLS regression of ADJ_RES (defined as the 
difference between RES and the industry-median RES) on the set of variables identified 
in section 3.2. The tables report the results of using ADJ_RES, the indicator variable 
QUALITY, the instrumental variable FITQUALITY1 and the second instrumental 
variable FITQUALITY2 as alternative measures of reporting quality. 
The following specific models are estimated in the second stage across firms and 
time: 
 
ϑρρρρρρρ tititititititie FQGROWTHELEVERAGEMBSIZEBETAR ti ,,,5 6,4,3,2,10 __, +++++++=      (3a) 
ζχχχχχχ titititititie FQLISTSTDRETVOLUMESIZESPREAD ti ,5 ,,4,3,2,0 1, +++++= +        (3b) 
πλλλλλ tititititie FQANALYSTSURPSIZEDISP ti ,,4,3,2,10, +++++=          (3c)  
ψϖϖϖϖϖϖ titititititie FQGROWTHROAEPSSIZEANALYST ti ,,6,5,3,2,10, ++++++=         (3d) 
Where: 
 
Re t,i   Implied Cost of equity capital for firm i, year t, using the Ohlson and  
  Juettner-Nauroth [2000] model; 
BETA t,i  The market beta for firm i in year t, estimated using a rolling window of   
  five years of monthly returns where the CRSP weighted market return is  
  used as the market return; 
SIZE t,i  Natural logarithm of market capitalization for firm i, at the end of the  
  fiscal year t, calculated as the closing price at fiscal year-end times the  
  number of shares outstanding at fiscal year-end (Compustat annual data  
  item #199 times Compustat annual data item #25); 
B_Mi,t  Book-to-Market ratio, where market value of equity is calculated as the  
  closing price at fiscal year-end times the number of shares outstanding at  
  fiscal year-end (Compustat annual data item #199 times Compustat annual  
  data item #25), divided by the book value of common equity (Compustat  
  annual data item #60); 
LEVERAGE t,i Long term debt (Compustat annual data item #9) plus debt in current  
  liabilities (Compustat annual data item #34) divided by total assets  
  (Compustat annual data item #6) for firm i at year t; 
GROWTH_E t,i Expected long term growth in earnings, defined as the percentage change  
  in the mean two-year ahead earnings forecast (obtained from Zacks) from  
  the current earnings realization (Compustat annual data item #58); 
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FQ ti ,  Financial reporting quality measure, which is equal to one of the 
following: QUALITY: Indicator variable equal to one if RESi,t ≤  Industry 
median RES; ADJ_RES: Industry-adjusted RESi,t ; FITQUALITY1: 
Instrumental variable which is equal to the fitted probabilities obtained  
from a Probit regression, where the dependent variable is QUALITY; 
FITQUALITY2: Instrumental variable which is equal to the fitted value  
obtained from an OLS regression, where the dependent variable is 
ADJ_RES;  
SPREADit Mean daily bid-ask spread scaled by the midpoint of the spread, averaged 
over the 12 months starting as of June subsequent to fiscal year 
t,
2/)BIDASK(
BIDASK
+
−  ; 
VOLUMEit Natural logarithm of the daily number of shares traded for firm i  
  averaged over the 12 months starting as of June subsequent to fiscal year t; 
STDRETit Firm i’s standard deviation of daily holding period return averaged over 
the 12 months starting as of the June subsequent to fiscal year t; 
LISTit  A dummy variable which equals 1 if firm i was listed on NASDAQ over 
the corresponding period and zero for NYSE/AMEX firms; 
DISP t,i  Standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts of year t earnings per share  
  (Zacks) for firm i, measured in June following fiscal year t-1, scaled by  
  beginning of period price; 
SURP t,i  Absolute value of the difference between current year’s earnings per  
  share (Compustat annual data item #58) and the previous year earnings per  
  share, scaled by average total assets of the firm; 
ANALYST t,i  Number of analysts issuing forecasts at the same time DISP was  
  calculated (Zacks); 
EPS t,i   Earnings per share before discontinued operations and extraordinary  
  items (Compustat annual data item #58) adjusted for stock splits and  
  dividends, for firm i at year t; 
ROA t,i  Return on assets for firm i at year t, calculated as earnings before  
  discontinued operations and extraordinary items (Compustat annual data  
  item #18) divided by total assets (Compustat annual data item #6); 
GROWTH t,i  Growth in net sales for firm i, calculated as net sales for year t  
  (Compustat annual data item #12) less net sales of year t-1, scaled by net  
  sales for year t-1; 18 
ψπυζ titititi ,,,, ,,, Error terms assumed to have zero mean and constant variance. 
 
 Given that my analysis is focused on long term capital market consequences, I 
perform the tests over annual windows. Specifically, following Gebhardt et al. [2001] and 
Guay et al. [2003], I estimate the firm-specific implied cost of capital using the stock 
price as of July 1 each year. Following the approach used in these studies, I collect 
                                                 
18 As an alternative measure of growth opportunities, I used the firm’s dividend payout ratio since this variable may 
provide a signal regarding the firm’s future growth opportunities. The significance of the reported results is unchanged 
using this alternative measure. 
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analysts’ earnings forecasts from June of each year, rather than from different points in 
the calendar year. Use of the stock price as of July 1, assumes that capital market 
participants are aware of the firm’s financial reporting quality choice for the most recent 
fiscal year ending prior to June. This methodology makes sure that the implied cost of 
capital is an ex ante proxy for risk-premium, which relies on financial information known 
prior to its estimation date. I apply this same procedure to the other measures of capital 
market consequences, bid-ask spreads and analysts’ forecasts properties.19 
 Equations (3a)-(3d) are estimated using both pooled cross-sectional time-series 
regressions and Fama-MacBeth regressions. I report the results of the Fama-MacBeth 
regressions, for which I run cross-sectional regressions annually and then average the 
annual coefficients across the sample years from 1987-2001. I use the standard deviation 
of the coefficients across the fifteen sample years to compute the t-statistics:
n
t σ
β
β
−
= ; 
where
−β  is the average coefficient based on the yearly regressions, σβ is the time-series 
standard deviation corresponding to each coefficient, and n is the number of years. Since 
the autocorrelation between the coefficients in the annual regressions can affect the true 
standard errors and thus inflate the t-statistics, I correct the t-statistics in a manner 
consistent with Bernard [1995]. 
3.3.1 The Firm’s Cost of Equity Capital 
 Following Barone [2002] and Francis et al. [2003a, 2003b], lower quality 
financial reporting leads to a greater uncertainty and ultimately to higher information 
risk. If this risk cannot be diversified, it will result in a higher cost of equity capital. In 
such a case, one will expect to find that ρ 6 >0 (equation (3a)) when the independent 
variable is either ADJ_RES or FITQUALITY2, and ρ 6 <0 when the independent variable 
is either the indicator variable QUALITY or the instrumental variable FITQUALITY1 
(the higher FITQUALITY1, the higher the probability of reporting high-quality financial 
information, which suggests a lower cost of equity capital).  
 Following this rationale, I test the association between the empirical measures of 
reporting quality outlined in section 3.2 and an implied cost of equity capital metric 
                                                 
19 For equations (3b)-(3d), I have also estimated the relevant variables averaged over the 12 months starting as of the 
last day of the first quarter subsequent to fiscal year t. The results were similar to those reported. 
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estimated using the model presented in Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth [2000] (hereafter 
referred as the OJ model). Previous studies have used different measures for the cost of 
capital. Since the cost of capital is not an observed phenomenon, one needs to estimate it 
precisely. Some of the cost of capital estimation methods used in the literature are based 
on the Fama-French three-factor model (Fama and French [1993]). As Fama and French 
[1997] point out, cost of capital estimates based on the three-factor model are imprecise, 
both at the firm level and the industry level. Another alternative is to proxy for the cost of 
capital by using realized stock returns. This approach has problems too, given that the 
correlations between expected returns and ex post realized returns are weak (Elton 
[1999]). These approaches have led researchers to infer ex ante the cost of capital using 
an implied cost of capital approach. Following this approach, assuming a valuation 
model, one estimates the implicit cost of capital using the current stock price and 
observable proxies for market expectations of future cash flows or earnings (usually 
analysts’ earnings forecasts). 
 The OJ model generalizes the Gordon growth model by allowing the short term 
growth rate to differ from the perpetual growth rate. The OJ model has two appealing 
features. First, it uses earnings rather than dividends, it does not require any forecasts of 
book value of equity or return on equity, and it does not make any assumptions regarding 
long-term industry profitability. This implies that one need not make any assumptions 
either about the firm’s payout policy, beyond the expected dividends of next period, or 
about clean surplus. Second, the OJ model is parsimonious; it assumes that the short-term 
growth rate decays asymptotically to the perpetual growth rate, which equals the long-
term economic growth rate.  
 The results documented in Gode and Mohanram [2002] suggest that the OJ risk- 
premium metric is a robust and appealing measure of the cost of capital.20 Specifically, 
they provide evidence that the OJ metric correlates with known risk factors (such as 
book-to-market, size, growth, and beta) in predicted ways when one uses a pooled cross-
sectional time-series setting, and also when one runs annual regressions. Moreover, Gode 
and Mohanram [2002] report that the OJ cost of capital metric has an economically 
significant association with ex post stock returns.21 Overall, their results suggest that in 
                                                 
20 The main assumptions and results of the model are described in detail in Appendix B.  
21 One way to evaluate an ex ante measure of risk-premium is to test its correlation with ex post realized stock returns. 
Although Gode and Mohanram [2002] provide evidence that risk-premium metrics based on residual income valuation 
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spite of the model’s parsimoniousness and its ignoring of book values and industry 
profitability, the OJ metric provides risk-premium estimates that reflect the market’s 
perception of risk.  
 Previous studies have identified a number of risk factors that are associated with 
expected returns. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) implies that the firm’s 
expected return is positively associated with its market beta. I include BETA in equation 
(3a) to control for this risk factor. A positive relation is expected between BETA and the 
cost of capital. 
 Given the evidence documented in the finance literature, in order to proxy for the 
firm’s total information environment, I include a measure of the firm’s size in equation 
(3a). I use the firm’s market capitalization and expect a negative association between 
SIZE and the implied cost of capital.22  
 Fama and French [1992] find that, compared to lower book-to-market firms, 
higher book-to-market firms earn higher realized returns. To control for risk factors 
associated with this measure, I include in equation (3a) B_M, the firm’s book-to-market 
ratio, and expect a positive association between this variable and the cost of capital. 
 The majority of the valuation models used both in the accounting and finance 
literature imply that, ceteris paribus, as future growth in the payoff stream increases, the 
expected return also increases (La Porta [1996]). Given my focus on expected returns 
rather than on realized rates of return, I expect to find a positive association between the 
expected growth in the firm’s profitability and the cost of capital. To capture this 
prediction, I include E_GROWTH, which is calculated as the percentage change in the 
mean two-year ahead earnings forecast from the current earnings realization. 
3.3.2 Financial Reporting Quality and Information Asymmetry 
 Analytical research has shown that, in addition to the release of public financial 
information, the quality of financial disclosures should also affect information 
asymmetries in the capital markets (Diamond and Verrecchia [1991]). Copeland and 
Galai [1983] and Glosten and Milgrom [1985] suggest that bid-ask spreads are associated 
with investors’ perceived levels of information asymmetry. To examine whether the 
                                                                                                                                                 
models result in higher correlations, the sign and significance of the results are sensitive to the assumptions one makes 
on the level of industry profitability (in particular the rate of convergence to the median-industry ROE and its effect on 
the terminal value calculation), and the inclusion or exclusion of loss firms. 
22 All the tests were repeated using the firm’s total assets instead of its market capitalization in order to avoid any 
mechanical relation between market value and the implied cost of capital. The results were similar to those reported in 
the tables. 
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quality of public financial statements affects perceived levels of information 
asymmetries, I focus on the firms’ bid-ask spreads (equation (3b)). Given the theoretical 
predictions outlined in Section 2, I expect that, as the quality of accounting information 
provided in the firm’s financial reports increases, the level of information asymmetry 
decreases. According to this prediction,χ5 < 0 (corresponding to the instrumental variable 
FITQUALITY1) in equation (3b), which suggests that higher quality financial 
information is associated with lower relative bid-ask spreads.  
 Prior studies in the accounting literature use bid-ask spreads to test the effects of 
earnings announcements and firms’ disclosures policies on the level of information 
asymmetry (Lee, Mucklow, and Ready [1993], Healy, Hutton, and Palepu [1999], Leuz 
and Verrecchia [2000]). Given the evidence presented in these studies, I use the mean 
daily bid-ask spread, scaled by the mid-point of the spread as the dependent variable in 
equation (3b).  
 In addition to the financial reporting quality variable, the regression equation 
includes other determinants that previous studies have found to be associated with bid-
ask spreads. In particular, I control for the trading volume in the firm’s stock, the firm’s 
size, variance of stock returns, and the exchange the firm is listed on. The dummy 
variable LIST is assigned a value of one if the firm is listed on NASDAQ and zero for 
NYSE/AMEX firms. LIST is included to control for the institutional differences between 
the different exchanges. This control variable reflects the finance literature’s growing 
awareness of the importance of institutional differences across stock exchanges in 
determining the behavior of securities. Given concerns regarding the use of bid-ask 
spreads as a proxy for information-asymmetry for long horizon specifications, I also 
examine the properties of analyst forecasts.23 
3.3.3 Effects of Financial Reporting Quality on Analyst Forecasts and Following 
 Financial statements that provide higher quality information are predicted to 
reduce investor uncertainty and lower the information risk for a specific firm. In equation 
(3c) and (3d), I test the effect of reporting quality on analysts’ behavior, as captured by 
the standard deviation of analysts’ annual earnings estimates for a given year and the 
number of analysts providing a forecast in a given period. 
                                                 
23 The use of bid-ask spreads as a proxy for information asymmetry suffers from a few deficiencies. Given the different 
components of the bid-ask spread, such as order processing costs and inventory costs, the total bid-ask spread might be 
a rough proxy for the adverse selection component. 
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  The focus on analyst forecast dispersion is motivated by Barry and Brown 
[1985], who argue that this variable is an appropriate proxy for estimation risk. Firms 
have incentives to reduce the dispersion among analysts, and hence the overall dispersion 
in capital market earnings expectations, in order to indirectly reduce the firm’s cost of 
equity capital. Given the existing literature’s findings, I include variables identified as 
being associated with the variation in analysts’ forecasts dispersion: SIZE, SURP, and 
ANALYST. Firm size and the number of analysts following a firm have been found to be 
positively related to analyst forecast accuracy (negatively associated to forecast 
dispersion). SURP is included in equation (3b) to capture the difficulty in forecasting 
earnings. 
 Previous research has suggested that greater analyst following improves the 
liquidity of the firm’s stock (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia [1991]). To examine whether 
analyst following is positively associated with financial reporting quality, I estimate 
equation (3d). I include the following control variables, which previous studies have 
shown to be associated with analyst following: SURP, SIZE, ROA, and GROWTH.  
4. Data and Empirical Results 
4.1 Sample Selection 
I base my analysis on data obtained from the following sources: the 2002 
COMPUSTAT annual industrial and research files, the 2002 CRSP files, and Zacks 
Investment Research (Zacks) data for 1987-2001. Previous studies (e.g. Collins and 
Hribar [2002], Dechow, Kothari, and Watts [1998]) document and discuss how using 
balance sheet accounts to derive cash flow from operations can lead to problems like 
noisy and biased estimates. The cash flow from operations reported in the statement of 
cash flows subsequent to the Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 95 (SFAS 
No.95) is likely to have less measurement error. I therefore use the 1987-2001 period 
since cash flow from operations (Compustat annual data item #308) calculated from the 
statement of cash flows only becomes available in 1987, following SFAS No. 95.24  
I exclude firms in SIC codes 6000-6999 (financial institutions, insurance, and real 
estate companies) since the cash flow predictability empirical model developed does not 
reflect their activities. Next, I restrict the analysis to firms that do not have any missing 
                                                 
24 SFAS No. 95 requires firms to present a statement of cash flows for fiscal years ending after July 15, 1988. Some 
firms early-adopted SFAS No. 95, so my sample begins in 1987. This sample selection is consistent with Barth et al. 
[2001].  
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data for the variables used in the empirical analysis, and I exclude observations with the 
most extreme one percent value of their distributions.25 I require that each firm has at 
least one year of past and future cash flow from operations. These criteria yield a primary 
sample of 16,664 firm-year observations, representing 2,363 firms.  
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
An examination of the descriptive statistics reported in Table 2 suggests that the 
sample firms are large relative to the COMPUSTAT population, with mean (median) 
total assets of $1,799 million  ($288 million) and mean (median) market value of equity 
of $1,848 million ($262 million), profitable (return on assets of about 0.034), and 
growing (median sales growth of 0.089).  
The operating cycle (OC) has a mean of 136 days and a standard deviation of 122 
days. This indicates that the majority of the firms in the sample have an operating cycle 
of less than one year. This finding is consistent with the fact that most accruals reverse 
within one year (Dechow and Dichev [2002]). The mean (median) of HERF (the 
concentration ratio) is 0.27 (0.25), indicating that the sample represents rather 
competitive industries.  
 Table 3 provides Pearson (above the diagonal) and Spearman (below the 
diagonal) correlations among the variables used to estimate equation (2). As predicted, 
the quality of financial reporting, as measured by the indicator variable QUALITY, is 
significantly and positively associated with OWNER, LEVERAGE, and CAPITAL 
(QUALITY takes the value of one if RES, the residuals obtained from a regression of 
future operating cash flows on current operating cash flows and accrual components, is 
lower than the two-digit SIC industry median and zero otherwise). On the other hand, 
QUALITY is significantly negatively correlated with HERF and GROWTH.  The 
positive association between OWNER and QUALITY suggests that firms with a less 
concentrated investor base, who are likely to face higher demands for firm-specific 
information, provide a higher quality of information. Consistent with the prediction 
regarding LEVERAGE, a positive correlation implies that more leveraged firms tend to 
provide financial information of higher quality. 
 The level of industry concentration, as captured by the concentration ratio HERF, 
is negatively correlated with the reporting quality measure. This negative correlation 
                                                 
25 The results and inferences reported are not affected by eliminating the extreme values of the distribution. 
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suggests that the higher the concentration ratio, the less competitive the industry, and the 
more likely competitors are to engage in anti-competitive activity, the less likely it is that 
future cash flows can be accurately predicted from the public financial information 
provided in annual reports. Taken together, the univariate analysis shows that the quality 
of financial reporting, as empirically measured by QUALITY, is positively associated 
with a proxy for firm-specific information demand and negatively associated with 
different proxies for proprietary costs. The latter finding implies that the higher the 
proprietary costs proxies, the lower the quality of the financial information that firms 
disclose in their financial reports.   
 The statistically significant correlations reported in Table 3 between the reporting 
quality measure and some of its identified determinants highlight the importance of using 
a two-stage estimation method to test the association between reporting quality and its 
associated economic consequences. Failure to do so will result in an econometric 
problem, which would influence and affect both the results and the interpretations made 
from the analysis (for a detailed discussion, please see the econometric discussion 
presented in Appendix A).   
4.3 Multivariate Analysis – Determinants of Financial Reporting Quality 
 As discussed in section 3.1, I estimate a Probit model to examine the determinants 
of reporting quality. I present results of a multivariate analysis from estimating the Probit 
model of equation (2) in Table 4. Coefficients and p-values are reported in the middle 
column. The last column presents an estimate of the marginal probability effect suggested 
by the coefficient. The marginal probability represents the change in the probability of 
providing high quality financial information for a one standard deviation change in the 
respective independent variable.26 Firms with a more diverse ownership base (OWNER) 
and higher leverage (LEVERAGE) are significantly more likely to provide high-quality 
financial information. These two factors are the strongest determinants of whether firms 
choose a high or low reporting quality. These results suggest that investors’ demands for 
financial information and monitoring devices influence the likelihood of firms providing 
high-quality information.  
                                                 
26 The effect of a standard deviation change in the independent variable is calculated by multiplying the estimated 
coefficient by )X'(βφ  where φ is the probability density function for the normal distribution, and X'β is computed 
at the mean values of the independent variables. 
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 In addition, I find evidence that proprietary costs affect the reporting quality 
decision. In particular, the results indicate that competition within an industry, measured 
by HERF (the Hefindahl-Hirshman Index), affects reporting quality. The coefficient of 
HERF and its marginal probability are significantly negative, suggesting that firms in less 
competitive industries are less likely to report high-quality information. This result is 
consistent with the findings of Harris [1998], who demonstrates that firms are less likely 
to disclose operations in less competitive industries as business segments. In other words, 
a higher quality of information prevails in more competitive environments. This result is 
consistent with theoretical models predicting less disclosure in less competitive markets 
(e.g., Hayes and Lundholm [1996]). On the other hand, this result is not consistent with 
disclosure models that predict that firms respond to higher levels of competition by 
providing less information (e.g., Verrecchia [1983]).  
 CAPITAL has a significant positive effect on reporting quality, which suggests 
that more capital-intensive firms provide financial information that more precisely 
predicts future cash flows. One explanation for this finding is that capital intensity acts as 
a barrier to entry for future competitors in the product market. Therefore, such firms incur 
less proprietary costs in providing financial information, as reflected in the reported 
disaggregated earnings, which are more informative regarding future performance. The 
coefficient on GROWTH, is not significant at conventional levels, though its direction is 
as predicted. 
 The results indicate that the larger the firm, the higher the quality of its financial 
reporting. This finding is consistent with previous research documenting a positive 
relation between firm size and disclosure policy decisions (e.g., Lang and Lundholdm 
[1993]). The significant coefficient on MARGIN bears out the hypothesis that more 
profitable firms (as reflected in higher realize margins) have the higher proprietary costs 
associated with lower reporting quality. The negative coefficient on MARGIN is 
consistent with the findings in Piotroski [2003], who interprets MARGIN as a proxy for 
proprietary costs, but inconsistent with previous findings that firm performance is 
positively related to disclosure policies (e.g., Lang and Lundholm [1993]).   
4.4 Second-Stage Analysis: Economic Consequences of Financial Reporting Quality 
 In this section I examine the capital markets consequences associated with 
financial reporting quality choices. I examine the effects of financial reporting quality on 
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four proxies for capital market valuation consequences: 1) the firm’s cost of capital, 2) 
the mean daily bid-ask spread (a proxy for the firm’s perceived information asymmetry), 
3) the dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts (a proxy for uncertainty and estimation 
risk), and 4) the number of analysts following the firm (a proxy for the informativeness of 
a firm’s information environment).  
 Using either the fitted probabilities from estimating a Probit model in the first 
stage as an instrumental variable for the reporting quality measure (FITQUALITY1) or 
the fitted values from a OLS regression (FITQUALITY2) where the dependent variable in 
the first stage estimation is ADJ_RES (the industry-adjusted RES), I estimate an OLS 
regression of capital market/valuation benefits proxies on firm characteristics and the 
financial reporting quality measure.  
4.4.1 Cost of Equity Capital   
 Table 5 presents the results obtained using industry-adjusted earnings-price ratios 
(E/P) as a measure of risk-premium. These results serve as a benchmark, since a generic 
Gordon growth model takes the following form:
gR
EP
e −=
, and g
P
E
Re += . 
The discussion in section 3.3.1 shows that the OJ model extends the Gordon growth 
model by allowing the short-term growth to differ from the perpetual growth rate. The 
E/P ratio can therefore be used as a benchmark measure of the risk-premium. All four 
columns in Table 5 support the assertion that E/P is negatively associated with long-term 
growth (E_GROWTH). This relation is expected, since the E/P ratio equals the risk 
premium Re minus the growth rate. The first two columns suggest that higher reporting 
quality is associated with lower E/P ratios (δ QUALITY5  = -0.0022, t-statistic = 3.59; 
δ RESADJ _5  = 0.1015, t-statistic = 6.09). However, controlling for the reporting quality 
choice and using the instrumental variables FITQUALITY1 and FITQUALITY2, I find 
that reporting quality is not significantly associated with the E/P ratio. This finding 
suggests that lower financial reporting quality does not necessarily imply a higher risk-
premium. 
 Table 6 presents the results of examining whether reporting quality explains the 
variation in firm-specific implied cost of capital measures.  Columns A and B of Table 6 
report the results of estimating equation (3a), using QUALITY, the indicator variable and 
ADJ_RES (the industry-adjusted residuals obtained from estimating equation (1)) as the 
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empirical measures of reporting quality. Both earnings quality metrics are significantly 
associated with the cost of capital after controlling for expected growth and other risk 
factors identified in the accounting and finance literature.27 These results imply that firms 
providing high-quality accounting information enjoy a lower cost of capital. Given these 
results, one could conclude that the reporting quality is an information risk factor which 
is priced by capital market participants, over and beyond additional risk factors priced by 
the market, such as beta, size, and book-to-market.  
 The results listed in Column C and D of Table 6, however, suggest that this 
conclusion does not hold up when one acknowledges the endogeneity that characterizes 
the reporting quality decision. If the specification estimated in Columns A and B is 
subject to a correlated omitted variables problem (as shown in Appendix A), the 
estimated value of the coefficient corresponding to the particular treatment effect may be 
biased and inconsistent. The instrumental variables FITQUALITY1 and FITQUALITY2 
are not significant in explaining the cross-sectional variation in the cost of equity capital 
estimates over and above previously documented risk factors which influence the cost of 
equity capital. Consistent with findings in the literature, I find that the cost of equity 
capital proxy used in this study is associated with firm size and expected growth, as well 
as with risk factors measured by market beta, the book-to-market ratio, and financial 
leverage. These results demonstrate the importance of accounting for the endogenous 
feature of financial reporting decisions.28 Failing to do so significantly affects the 
conclusions researchers draw from empirical analyses. The discrepancy between the 
significant associations reported in Columns A and B and the results reported in Columns 
C and D may be due to omitted correlated factors affecting reporting quality. Once these 
factors are accounted for, any conclusions and inferences must reflect the results reported 
in Columns C and D. 
   Based on these results, one cannot infer that increasing the quality of reported 
earnings will necessarily result in a decreased cost of capital. These findings are 
consistent with some of the evidence documented in Francis et al. [2003b] regarding the 
pricing effects of discretionary accruals quality. When these authors distinguish between 
                                                 
27 A higher value of ADJ_RES implies a lower quality of earnings, whereas QUALITY=1 represent a high quality 
reporting firm-year observation. 
28 In the presence of multicollinearity, OLS estimation will provide more robust estimates than 2SLS. To address this 
problem, I compute the variance inflation factors for each regression. The results suggest that multicollinearity is not a 
problem.  
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two components of accruals quality, a non-discretionary and a discretionary one, they 
find that the discretionary component (measured as a raw variable) is not significantly 
associated with industry-adjusted earnings-price ratios. Using a different empirical 
methodology than the one I use in this study, Francis et al. [2003b] generally find that the 
“discretionary component  of accruals quality, on average, has a significantly smaller 
pricing effect than the innate component of accruals quality” (page 39), and “we find that 
the cost of capital effect of a unit of discretionary accruals quality is both smaller and 
(often) less statistically significant than the cost of capital effect of a unit of innate 
accruals quality” (page 5). 
 In summary, the results in this section suggest that the reporting quality measure 
used in the analysis is not an additional priced risk factor over and beyond previously 
documented risk factors.  In other words, lower financial reporting quality does not result 
in a significant higher cost of equity capital. 
4.4.2 Measurement Error in the Implied Cost of Capital Estimate 
 Implied cost of capital estimates make use of analysts’ earnings forecasts of both 
short-term and long-term earnings. Using analysts’ forward looking information might 
provide better estimates of the cost of capital than estimates obtained from asset pricing 
models (e.g., CAPM or the three-factor Fama-French models). The use of analysts’ 
forecasts does come with a cost, however. Analysts’ earnings forecasts potentially have 
problems that might affect the precision of the cost of capital estimates. For instance, Lys 
and Sohn [1990] find that analyst short-term earnings forecasts only contain roughly 66% 
of the information reflected by security prices prior to the forecast-release date. If 
analysts do not revise their forecasts in response to recent stock prices changes, which 
proxy for changes in the overall capital market expectation of future earnings, using those 
forecasts as inputs in valuation models to estimate the implied cost of capital introduces 
systematic error into these estimates. These errors are therefore correlated with recent 
stock price performance. In particular, if analysts’ earnings forecasts are slower to reflect 
revisions in the capital market’s expectation than stock prices, then the ex ante implied 
cost of capital estimate will be too low (high) when recent stock returns have been high 
(low).29 
                                                 
29 The intuition behind this prediction is the following: when earnings forecasts are too low, for example after recent 
positive stock returns, the implied cost of capital derived from using the current stock price and the present value of 
future earnings will be too low. 
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 Guay, Kothari and Shu [2003] discuss these problems in detail and report 
evidence that errors in analysts’ earnings forecasts are negatively correlated with recent 
stock returns. Guay et al. [2003] propose two solutions that address the predictable error 
in the implied cost of capital estimates: use recent stock returns as a control variable, and 
estimate the implied cost of capital using different stock prices within a calendar year. To 
control for the negative correlation between the implied cost of capital estimates and 
recent stock returns, I re-estimate equation (3a) controlling for RETURN, defined as 
stock returns measured over the one year period prior to the July 1st measurement date of 
the implied cost of capital estimate.  
 The results in Table 7 provide evidence consistent with Guay et al. [2003]’s 
findings that the OJ implied cost of capital estimate is significantly negatively associated 
with recent stock returns. However, even after controlling for recent stock returns, the 
association between the cost of capital estimate and reporting quality squares with the 
results reported in Table 6, suggesting that financial reporting quality is not significantly 
associated with the cost of capital. 
 Guay et al. [2003] also recommend a different estimation procedure for 
calculating the implied cost of capital, one that allows analysts more time to make use of 
recent price movements in their earnings forecasts. This procedure estimates the implied 
cost of capital using the stock price as of January instead of July 1st. Although I use this 
different stock price, I still continue to use analysts’ earnings forecasts from June. I report 
the results of using this alternative implied cost of capital measure in Table 8. This 
alternative approach does not affect the previously documented results. Controlling for 
the endogenous character of the reporting quality choice, reporting quality is not 
significantly associated with a firm’s cost of equity capital.   
4.4.3 Reporting Quality and Information Asymmetry 
 Table 9 presents the results regarding the association between reporting quality 
and levels of information asymmetries as proxied by bid-ask spreads. The coefficients of 
SIZE, VOLUME, and STDRET are both highly significant and consistent with evidence 
in the extant literature. Table 9 chiefly indicates that higher reporting quality is associated 
with lower bid-ask spreads.  
 The results in Columns C and D suggest that higher reporting quality, even after 
incorporating the endogenous nature of the reporting choice (i.e., using the instrumental 
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variables FITQUALITY1 and FITQUALITY2), leads to significantly lower bid-ask 
spreads. Consistent with the hypothesis discussed in section 3, providing financial 
information of higher quality is thus associated with lower levels of perceived 
information asymmetries. Taken together, the results in this section and the previous one 
suggest that, although reporting quality may proxy for uncertainty or information risk, 
this type of firm-specific information risk does not seem to be priced by investors and it 
does not increase the firm’s cost of capital. In other words, the firm-specific uncertainty 
regarding the estimation of future payoffs does not translate into a higher implied cost of 
equity capital. This evidence addresses empirical questions raised by Clarkson et al. 
[1996] regarding the pricing effects of the uncertainty associated with the prediction of 
future firm-specific payoff parameters.   
4.4.4 Reporting Quality and Analyst Behavior 
 As reported in Table 10, after controlling for other determinants of analyst 
forecast dispersion, all the empirical measures of financial reporting quality display a 
significant association in the predicted direction with analyst forecast dispersion. This 
finding suggests that firms choosing to report high-quality financial information enjoy a 
lower level of dispersion, which implies in turn that investors form more precise beliefs 
about future earnings. Interpreting dispersion as a proxy for estimation risk and 
uncertainty, firms enjoy lower estimation risk by reporting accounting numbers of higher 
quality. This result is consistent with findings in Lang and Lundholm [1996] who 
document a negative association between AIMR scores as proxies for firms’ disclosure 
policies and analyst forecast dispersion. The sign and significance of the remaining 
estimated coefficients in Table 10 (all but SIZE in Columns C and D) tally with findings 
documented in previous studies (e.g., Piotroski [2003]). 
 Table 11 reports the results from estimating equation (3d), which addresses the 
relation between the number of analysts following a firm and the empirical measure of 
reporting quality, after controlling for other determinants of analysts following. Other 
than the indicator variable QUALITY, all reporting quality measures display a significant 
relation with the number of analysts following the firm, which suggests that the number 
of analysts following a firm increases as the quality of financial information provided in 
firms’ financial statements increases. This result, consistent with previous findings in the 
literature (Lang and Lundholm [1996]), allows us to infer that the informativeness of a 
 32
firm’s information environment increases with the quality of the financial information 
firms provide. Moreover, this finding is consistent with anecdotal evidence suggesting 
that financial analysts tend to follow firms that have a more predictable performance 
stream. The positive significant coefficients both on firm size and firm performance 
(ROA) are consistent with findings documented in Bhushan [1989].  
 The evidence on the relation between analysts’ behavior and financial reporting 
quality suggests that by providing high-quality financial information, a firm can both 
increase the number of the analysts following it, thereby affecting the liquidity of the 
company’s stock (Diamond and Verrecchia [1991]), and reduce its information and 
estimation risk as proxied by the forecast dispersion (Barry and Brown [1985]).  
5. Conclusion 
 This paper provides empirical evidence on the trade-off between capital market 
valuation benefits and proprietary costs influencing firms’ quality of financial reporting 
decisions. These findings suggest that the variation in firms’ financial reporting policies 
is explained not only by the need to meet investors’ demands for firm-specific 
information, but also by the firm’s product market characteristics.  
 Introducing a new empirical measure of financial reporting quality, I show that 
the reporting quality choice is positively associated with capital markets benefits and 
negatively associated with proprietary costs proxies. By accounting for the endogenous 
nature of the reporting quality decision and thus controlling for firms’ corporate 
disclosure policies choices, I provide evidence that financial reporting quality is 
associated with lower levels of perceived information asymmetries (as proxied by bid-ask 
spreads). In addition, financial reporting quality is negatively associated with analyst 
forecast dispersion and positively associated with the number of analysts following a 
firm. I do not find, however, a significant negative association between firms’ cost of 
equity capital and financial reporting quality choices, after controlling for known risk 
factors. These results suggest that reporting quality is not necessarily an additional 
systematic risk factor, but rather a firm-specific factor associated with uncertainty and 
estimation precision, which investors do not price.   
 The results documented in this study contribute to the extant accounting literature 
in several ways. First, the study contributes to the stream of research analyzing the 
consequences of financial reporting quality decisions. In particular, the results illustrate 
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the importance of explicitly modeling the endogeneity of financial reporting quality 
choices when investigating the associated economic consequences. Failing to do so may 
lead to spurious inferences, as indicated by the results. Second, I suggest a reporting 
quality measure that is easily derived and can be used for a wide range of firms, unlike 
previous empirical measures, such as analysts’ disclosure quality ratings. Finally, this 
study’s findings show the importance of accounting not only for the benefits associated 
with financial reporting policies, but also for the associated costs. 
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Appendix A: Econometric Analysis 
This appendix highlights important econometric issues apparent in empirical 
disclosure studies. 
Assume that we want to estimate the following model using Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS): 
 
ε+θ+β= iii'i FQXY                (1) 
where Yi is the firm’s cost of capital proxy, FQi is a dummy variable indicating whether 
firm i is classified as providing high quality financial information compared to its 
industry peers, and Xi represents a set of control variables. 
In the empirical tests conducted, the question of interest is whether the coefficient 
θ  measures the effect of providing high quality financial information on the firm’s 
estimated cost of capital. The answer to this question is no if the typical firm that 
provides high quality financial  information would have a relatively lower cost of capital, 
i.e., Yi in equation (1) regardless of whether it provided high quality information in its 
financial statements. If so, then the coefficient θ  will overestimate the treatment effect. 
In order to illustrate this point, assume that providing high quality financial information is 
modeled as: 
η+ω= ii'*i ZFQ                 (2) 
where FQi=1 if FQi*>0, and FQi=0 otherwise. 
Assume that the typical firm that reports high quality financial information would 
have a relative low cost of capital regardless of its financial reporting policy. If this is the 
case, then the errors in the two models, εi and ηi are correlated.30 Combining the models 
presented in equation (1) and (2), we get the following (the subscript i is omitted): 
)Z'(
)Z'(X]1FQ|[EX]1FQ|Y[E ' ' ωΦ
ωφσρ+θ+β==ε+θ+β== ε           (3) 
For the low-quality reporting firms, the equivalent equation is: 
][
)Z'(1
)Z'(X]0FQ|Y[E ' ωΦ−
ωφ−σρ+β== ε              (4) 
And the difference in expectations is: 
                                                 
30 I assume that the error terms are following a normal distribution. The analysis can be done assuming any 
other distribution of the error terms. 
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]1FQ|Y[E = - ]0FQ|Y[E =  = θ+ σρ ε ][ ))Z'(1)(Z'(
)Z'(
ωΦ−ωφ
ωφ
, where )(Φφ is the 
normal density function (cumulative density function). 
If one does not correct for the selectivity in the original OLS model (equation 
(1)), the difference presented above is what actually is estimated by the OLS coefficient 
on the FQ treatment variable. If all terms are positive, then the OLS estimation procedure 
overestimates the treatment effect, in our case the effect of providing high quality 
financial information on the firm’s cost of capital. 
In order to overcome this bias, a selectivity correction can be included in the 
original OLS equation: 
)Z'(
)Z'(
ωΦ
ωφ=λ  if FQ=1 or 
)Z'(1
)Z'(
ωΦ−
ωφ−=λ  if FQ=0 
This setup is similar to the two-stage procedure introduced by Heckman [1979], but in 
this case the left hand side variable in equation (1), i.e., the proxy for the firm’s cost of 
capital is observed for all firms. Under this specification, the selectivity correction 
variableλ is an expansion of the Inverse Mills Ratio introduced in the Heckman [1979] 
procedure, and is equal to the Inverse Mills Ratio when FQ=1. 
The model can be estimated either by using Heckman’s two-stage estimation 
procedure which uses the estimates of equation (2) to derive an estimate of the selectivity 
correction and then include this correction in equation (1) or by other similar approaches.  
An alternative approach, which I use in the empirical analysis in this study, follows 
Barnow et al. [1980] and Wooldridge [2002]. Under this approach, the cost of capital 
model (equation (1)) is estimated using the fitted probabilities of providing high quality 
financial reporting from a Probit model. The fitted probabilities serve as an instrumental 
variable for the reporting quality variable. This approach follows from combining the two 
conditional expectations (for further details see Maddala [1983, p. 121]). This approach 
holds without assuming a normal distribution for the error terms, which makes it a less 
restrictive approach compared to Heckman’s two-stage procedure. This approach 
provides consistent estimates using OLS in the second stage estimation of the cost of 
capital model. 
The following illustrates the exact procedure: 
Step1: Estimate the binary response model of financial reporting quality choice: 
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Prob (FQ=1 | X Z) and obtain the fitted probabilities
^
iFQ . 
Step 2: Estimate equation (1), the cost of capital model by Instrumental Variables (IV) 
approach using the instruments 
^
iFQ and X. 
Under this estimation procedure, the IV estimator from step 2 is asymptotically efficient.  
 This procedure has an important property. Since I use 
^
iFQ as an instrument for 
FQi, the model in the first step, i.e., Prob (FQ=1 | X Z) does not have to be correctly 
specified. There is no identification problem in this case even if I do not have an extra 
exogenous variable excluded from the vector X.  Since the fitted probabilities are a 
nonlinear function of the variables included in the first step probit model, then the second 
step equation is identified, given this nonlinearity even in the extreme case when Z=X. 
However, a caveat is in place: if the first step probability model followed a linear 
probability model, then the treatment effect θ  would not be identified. 
Endogeneity of the Financial Reporting Decision 
Consider again equation (1) introduced above: 
ε+θ+β= iii'i FQXY                (1) 
FQi may be correlated with the error termεi , creating a potential econometric problem. 
This problem can arise due to either measurement error and/or omitted correlated 
variables. The reason that an omitted correlated variables problem may occur is due to 
the assertion that financial reporting quality may be a function of determinants which are 
not captured in the control variables vector X. Given the endogeneity problem, OLS 
estimation of equation (1) will provide inconsistent estimates of the parameters in 
equation (1). 
To illustrate the consequences of omitting correlated variables from the model 
specification, consider a revised version of equation (1), which includes an additional 
variable: W. Assume that W proxies for the competitive position in the firm’s product 
market (W can be a proxy for any identified determinant of financial reporting quality). 
WFQXY iii
'
i γ+θ+β=              (1b) 
Assuming that FQ is not measured with error, an OLS estimation would result in an 
asymptotically biased estimate: 
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plim 
^θ  = 
)(
),(
FQVAR
WFQCOVγθ + . If COV(FQ,W)>0, implying that firms that provide high 
quality financial information have also low proprietary costs as proxied by the 
concentration ratio in their product market, an OLS estimation equation (1) will 
overestimate θ  as long as γ >0. One solution to overcome this problem is to use the 
instrumental variable approach discussed in the first section of the appendix.  
 
Appendix B: Estimating the cost of capital using the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth 
(2000) method 
Consider the following valuation setting as of date 0. Define the following 
variables/parameters: 
P0 = Price per share at date 0; 
dpst = Dividends per share at time t; 
epst = Earnings per share at time t, and 
R =  1+re, or 1 + the cost of equity capital. 
Assumption A1: The present value of the expected dividends per share sequence equals 
price per share: 
dpsRP t
1t
t
0 ∑∞
=
−=                 (1) 
Next, Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth [2000] introduce the following algebraic equation (or 
identity) into the dividend discount valuation model: 
...0 2
1201
0 +⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+=
R
Ryy
R
Ryyy              (2) 
Where { }∞=0tty  can be any sequence of numbers that satisfy the following 
condition: 0→− TT yR as ∞→T .   
Equation (2) holds because yR)yRy(Ry T
T
1tt
T
1t
t
0
−
−
=
− =−+∑  
Adding equation (1) and equation (2) yields:  
∑∞
=
− ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −++=
1t
1ttt
00 R
RydpsyyP               (3) 
In order to introduce growth in the model, Equation (3) can be expressed as: 
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∑∞
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r
epsP                 (4) 
Where: 0y  = 1eps / re ;  ty = epst+1/re;   and  ( )tte1t
e
t eps*Rdpsrepsr
1z −+≡ +  
Assuming that the sequence { }∞=0ttz  satisfies tt zz γ=+1 for all t, where R<≤ γ1 and z1>0, 
we get:  
γ−+= R
z
r
epsP
e
11
0                (5) 
where ( )11e2
e
1 eps*Rdpsrepsr
1z −+≡  
Solving equation (5) for the implied cost of equity capital re, yields: 
( )⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −γ−∆++= 1
eps
eps*
P
epsAAr
1
2
0
12
e            (6) 
where:          ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−γ≡
0
1
P
dps1
2
1A , and 122 epsepseps −=∆  
In order to obtain firm-year estimates of re, I use equation (6), assuming that γ-1 
equals r f -3%, where r f  is the yield on 10-year notes (Gode and Mohanram [2002]). I 
use the current dividend payout ratio as an estimate of dps1 (Compustat annual data item 
#26) and obtain eps1 and eps2 from the Zacks database.  Firms which have annual 
earnings forecasts from Zacks that are negative must be eliminated from the sample, 
consistent with the assumption that z1>0. 
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Table 1: Variable Definitions 
EARN Income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (Compustat annual item #18). 
CFO Cash flow from operations (Compustat annual data item #308) minus the accrual portion of extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations per the statement of cash flows (Compustat annual data item #124). 
AR∆  Change in accounts receivable account per statement of cash flows (Compustat annual data item #302). 
INV∆  Change in inventory account per the statement of cash flows (Compustat annual data item #303). 
AP∆  Change in accounts payable and accrued liabilities account per the statement of cash flows (Compustat annual  
data item #304). 
DEPR Depreciation and Amortization Expense (Compustat annual data item #125). 
OTHER Net of all other accruals, calculated as EARN – (CFO+∆ AR+∆ INV-∆ AP-DEPR). 
RES The absolute value of residuals obtained from a regression of future operating cash  flows on current operating 
cash flows and accrual components. 
SIZE Natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end of the fiscal year, calculated as the closing price at fiscal 
year-end times the number of shares outstanding at fiscal year-end (Compustat annual data item #199 times 
Compustat annual data item #25). 
QUALITY An indicator variable equal to one if RES is less than the Industry median RES, and zero otherwise. 
ASSETS Total assets (Compustat annual data item #6). 
 
ROA 
Return on assets, defined as EARN (Compustat annual data item #18) divided by total assets (Compustat 
annual data item #6). 
B_M Book-to-Market ratio, where the book value of common equity (Compustat annual data item #60) is divided 
by market value of equity (calculated as the closing price at fiscal year-end times the number of shares 
outstanding at fiscal year-end (Compustat annual data item #199 times Compustat annual data item #25)). 
GROWTH Current year’s growth in sales, calculated as net sales for year t (Compustat annual data item #12) less net 
sales of year t-1, scaled by net sales for year t-1. 
E_GROWTH Expected long term growth in earnings, defined as the percentage change in the mean two-year ahead earnings 
forecast (obtained from Zacks) from the current earnings realization (Compustat annual data item #58). 
HERF The Herfindahl Index is calculated as the sum of squares of market shares in the industry: 
∑= =ni i SsHERF 1 2][ , where si is the firm’s sales and S is the sum of sales for all firms in the industry 
(defined by the two-digit SIC code), and n is the number of firms in the industry. 
LEVERAGE Long term debt (Compustat annual data item #9) plus debt in current liabilities (Compustat annual data item 
#34) divided by total assets (Compustat annual data item #6).  
CAPITAL Net plant, property and equipment (Compustat annual data item #8) divided by total assets (Compustat annual 
data item #6). 
OC Operating Cycle (in days), calculated as
)360/(
2/)(
)360/(
2/)( 11
COGS
INVINV
Sales
ARAR tttt −− +++ . 
N_SEG Number of two-digit SIC code industries that the firm is engaged in. 
MARGIN Gross margin percentage, calculated as the year t net sales (Compustat annual data item #12) less cost of 
goods sold for the year (Compustat annual data item #41), scaled by net sales. 
E_P RATIO Industry-adjusted earnings-price ratio. Annual earnings per share before discontinued operations and 
extraordinary items (Compustat annual item #58) divided by the July 1st price. 
Re  Cost of equity capital estimated from the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth [2000] model. 
DISP Standard Deviation of analysts’ forecasts of earnings per share, scaled by the beginning of the period price. 
SPREAD Mean daily bid-ask spread scaled by the midpoint of the spread, averaged over  the 12 months starting  
as of June subsequent to fiscal year t. 
VOLUME Natural logarithm of the daily number of shares traded averaged over the 12 months starting as of June  
subsequent to fiscal year t. 
STDRET Standard deviation of daily holding period return averaged over the 12 months starting as of June  
subsequent to fiscal year t. 
LIST A dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm was listed on NASDAQ over the corresponding period and zero 
otherwise. 
EPS Earnings per share before discontinued operations and extraordinary items (Compustat annual data item #58) 
adjusted for stock splits and dividends. 
ANALYST Number of analysts making EPS forecasts for firm i at the time DISP is calculated (data obtained from Zacks). 
BETA The market beta for firm i in year t, estimated using a rolling window of five years of monthly returns where 
the CRSP weighted market return is used as the market return. 
SURP Absolute value of the difference between current year’s earnings per share (Compustat annual data item #58) 
and the previous year earnings per share. 
OWNER Natural log of the number of shareholders of a firm (Compustat item #100) minus the natural log of median 
number of shareholders is same two-digit SIC code. 
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Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the total sample of 16,664 firm-year 
observations.  
 
Variables are defined in Table 1. 
VARIABLE MEAN MEDIAN STD. DEV. 
    
SIZE ($mil) 1848.71 262.23 5215.11 
ASSETS ($mil) 1799.75 288.12 4066.49 
ROA  0.034 0.042 0.118 
RES 0.055 0.036 0.064 
GROWTH 0.089 0.073 0.275 
HERF 0.273 0.246 0.118 
LEVERAGE 0.187 0.168 0.163 
OC (days) 136.12 122.70 75.70 
N_SEG 2.64 1.00 2.73 
Re  0.128 0.108 0.076 
SPREAD 0.0371 0.0325 0.0202 
DISP 0.0129 0.0054 0.046 
ANALYST 8.78 6.00 7.95 
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Table 3 
Correlation Matrix of Financial Reporting Quality Determinants  
 
This table reports Pearson (above the diagonal) and Spearman correlations (below the diagonal). The sample is based on 16,664 firm-
year observations.   
Variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
**,* - Correlation significant at the 5%, 1% level, respectively. 
 
 QUALITY OWNER MARGIN HERF GROWTH CAPITAL SIZE LEVERAGE OC N_SEG 
QUALITY 
  
0.193* 
 
-0.123* 
 
-0.144* 
 
-0.093** 
 
0.151* 
 
0.055* 
 
0.073* 
 
-0.019* 
 
0.061* 
OWNER 
 
0.236* 
  
-0.024* 
 
-0.057* 
 
-0.155* 
 
0.321* 
 
0.487* 
 
0.185* 
 
-0.159* 
 
0.281* 
MARGIN 
 
-0.091* 
 
-0.032* 
  
-0.094* 
 
0.010 
 
-0.041* 
 
0.091* 
 
-0.170* 
 
0.311* 
 
-0.118* 
 
HERF 
 
-0.023* 
 
-0.031* 
 
-0.081* 
  
0.004 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.023* 
 
0.032** 
 
0.018** 
 
0.011 
 
GROWTH 
 
 
-0.154* 
 
-0.081* 
 
0.027* 
 
-0.005 
  
-0.015** 
 
-0.03* 
 
-0.07* 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.11** 
CAPITAL 
 
0.302* 0.310* -0.051** 0.003 -0.027**  0.478* 0.191* -0.019* 0.234* 
SIZE 
 
0.158* 0.429* 0.137* 0.019 -0.021** 0.356*  0.0023 -0.13* 0.309* 
LEVERAGE 
 
0.097* 0.186* -0.209* 0.08* -0.004 0.200* 0.121*  -0.021* 0.165* 
OC 
 
-0.014** -0.152* 0.371* -0.09* -0.053* -0.175* -0.001 -0.017*  -0.042 
N_SEG 0.012* 0.209* -0.084** 0.017 -0.01 0.181* 0.203* 0.112* -0.023*  
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Table 4a 
Probit Analysis of the Determinants of Firms’ Financial Reporting Quality 
 
Probit analysis of the determinants of firms’ financial reporting quality. The binary dependent variable is 
equal to 1 if RES < Industry Median RES, where RES is the absolute value of the residuals obtained from 
the following industry regression estimated for each year t for each two-digit SIC code: 
ε ++ +β+β+∆β+∆β+∆β+β+α= 1t,it,i6t,i5t,i4t,i3t,i2t,i101t,i OTHERDEPRAPINVARCFOCFO  
 
All the variables in this table are defined in Table 1. 
 
HERFCAPITALGROWTHOWNER*QUALITY t,i4t,i3t,i2t,i101t,i φ+φ+φ+φ+φ=+  
 
            ξ+φ+φ+φ+φ+φ +SIZESEG_NOCMARGINLEVERAGE t,i9t,i8t,i7 1t,it,it,i5 6  
 
                 
VARIABLE PREDICTION COEFFICIENT 
(P-VALUE) 
MARGINAL 
PROB. 
OWNER 
 
+ 0.714*** 
(0.000) 
0.086 
GROWTH 
 
- -0.023 
(0.211) 
-0.002 
CAPITAL 
 
+ 0.00002*** 
(0.000) 
0.032 
HERF 
 
+/- -0.185*** 
(0.000) 
-0.022 
LEVERAGE 
 
+ 0.523*** 
(0.000) 
0.130 
MARGIN +/- -0.331*** 
(0.005) 
-0.031 
OC - -0.0005** 
(0.032) 
-0.030 
N_SEG 
 
+/- -0.021* 
(0.087) 
-0.013 
SIZE 
 
+ 0.002** 
(0.037) 
0.019 
    
Psuedo R2  14.45%  
 
***,**,* - Correlation significant at the 1%, 5%,10% level, respectively.
                                                 
a This table provides the results from estimating equation (2) for the sample firms. For each variable in the 
table, the estimated coefficient, the marginal probability, and the p-value are provided. The marginal 
probability represents the change in the probability of providing high quality financial information for a one 
standard deviation change in the independent variable of interest.  
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Table 5 
Consequences of Financial Reporting Quality: Association between Industry- 
Adjusted E/P Ratio and Reporting Quality 
 
          υδδδδδδ ττ ++ ++++++= tititititititi FQMBSIZELEVERAGEGROWTHEPE ,,5,4,,2,1, 0 _3__  
 
FQ = QUALITY FQ=ADJ_RES FQ=FITQUALITY1 FQ=FITQUALITY2  
 
 
VARIABLE Coefficient (t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
E_GROWTH -0.011 
(-9.29)*** 
-0.011 
(-9.64)*** 
-0.011 
(-9.95)*** 
-0.011 
(-9.76)*** 
LEVERAGE 0.0156 
(3.82)*** 
0.0180 
(4.23)*** 
0.0066 
(0.90) 
0.0177 
(2.72)** 
SIZE -0.0130 
(-9.78)*** 
-0.0130 
(-9.89)*** 
-0.0130 
(-9.75)*** 
-0.0130 
(-9.80)*** 
B_M 0.0066 
(8.99)*** 
0.0068 
(9.04)*** 
0.0057 
(6.68)*** 
0.0066 
(8.54)*** 
QUALITY -0.0022 
(-3.59)*** 
   
ADJ_RES  0.1015 
(6.09)*** 
  
FITQUALITY1   -0.0327 
(-1.62) 
 
FITQUALITY2    0.0947 
(0.79) 
Mean Adj. R2 0.1425 0.1555 0.1543 0.1553 
 
***, **, * Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level (two-tailed test). The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
RESi,t is equal to the absolute value of the residuals obtained from the following industry regression estimated for each 
year t for each two-digit SIC code: 
ε ++ +β+β+∆β+∆β+∆β+β+α= 1t,it,i6t,i5t,i4t,i3t,i2t,i101t,i OTHERDEPRAPINVARCFOCFO  
 
FQi,t – Financial reporting quality measure:  
 
QUALITY: Indicator variable equal to one if RESi,t < industry median RES. 
 
ADJ_RES: Industry-adjusted RESi,t . 
 
FITQUALITY1: Instrumental variable which is equal to the fitted probabilities obtained from a Probit estimation, 
where the dependent variable is QUALITY. 
 
FITQUALITY2: Instrumental variable which is equal to the fitted value obtained from an OLS regression, where the 
dependent variable is ADJ_RES. 
 
 
 
Table 5 reports mean coefficients and corresponding t-statistics (corrected for serial-correlation) from yearly OLS 
regressions. 
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Table 6 
Consequences of Financial Reporting Quality: Association between Firm-Specific 
Cost of Capital and Reporting Quality 
 
ϑρρρρρρρ tititititititie FQGROWTHELEVERAGEMBSIZEBETAR ti ,,,5 6,4,3,2,10 __, +++++++=  
FQ = QUALITY FQ=ADJ_RES FQ=FITQUALITY1 FQ=FITQUALITY2  
 
 
VARIABLE Coefficient (t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
BETA 0.0042 
(2.25)*** 
0.0041 
(2.20)** 
0.0045 
(2.55)*** 
0.0034 
(1.71) 
SIZE -0.0390 
(-11.77)*** 
-0.0390 
(-11.89)*** 
-0.0370 
(-15.38)*** 
-0.0370 
(-15.50)*** 
B_M 0.0214 
(8.98)*** 
0.0217 
(9.20)*** 
0.0191 
(11.67)*** 
0.2020 
(11.58)*** 
LEVERAGE 0.0472 
(6.76)*** 
0.0477 
(6.77)*** 
0.0307 
(5.04)*** 
0.0446 
(7.54)*** 
E_GROWTH 0.0155 
(5.38)*** 
0.0157 
(5.67)*** 
0.0159 
(5.76)*** 
0.0161 
(5.85)*** 
QUALITY -0.0034 
(-2.43)** 
   
ADJ_RES  0.0380 
(3.19)*** 
  
FITQUALITY1   -0.0544 
(-1.66) 
 
FITQUALITY2    0.0435 
(0.19) 
Mean Adj. R2 0.2832 0.2835 0.2917 0.2906 
 
***, **, * Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level (two-tailed test). The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
RESi,t is equal to the absolute value of the residuals obtained from the following industry regression estimated for each 
year t for each two-digit SIC code: 
ε ++ +β+β+∆β+∆β+∆β+β+α= 1t,it,i6t,i5t,i4t,i3t,i2t,i101t,i OTHERDEPRAPINVARCFOCFO  
 
FQi,t – Financial reporting quality measure:  
 
QUALITY: Indicator variable equal to one if RESi,t < industry median RES. 
 
ADJ_RES: Industry-adjusted RESi,t . 
 
FITQUALITY1: Instrumental variable which is equal to the fitted probabilities obtained from a Probit estimation, 
where the dependent variable is QUALITY. 
 
FITQUALITY2: Instrumental variable which is equal to the fitted value obtained from an OLS regression, where the 
dependent variable is ADJ_RES. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 reports mean coefficients and corresponding t-statistics (corrected for serial-correlation) from yearly OLS 
regressions. 
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Table 7 
Consequences of Financial Reporting Quality: Association between Firm-Specific 
Cost of Capital and Reporting Quality 
 
ϑρρρρρρρρ titititititititie FQRETURNGROWTHELEVERAGEMBSIZEBETAR ti ,,,6,5 7,4,3,2,10 __, ++++++++=
 
FQ = QUALITY FQ=ADJ_RES FQ=FITQUALITY1 FQ=FITQUALITY2  
 
 
VARIABLE Coefficient (t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
BETA 0.0054 
(3.39)*** 
0.0051 
(3.30)*** 
0.0045 
(2.85)** 
0.0043 
(2.66)** 
SIZE -0.360 
(-10.55)*** 
-0.0360 
(-10.37)*** 
-0.0340 
(-13.65)*** 
-0.0340 
(-13.46)*** 
B_M 0.0196 
(7.95)*** 
0.0198 
(7.83)*** 
0.0185 
(9.00)*** 
0.0186 
(9.34)*** 
LEVERAGE 0.0457 
(6.79)*** 
0.0483 
(6.50)*** 
0.0426 
(6.12)*** 
0.0445 
(6.58)*** 
E_GROWTH 0.0151 
(5.58)*** 
0.0150 
(5.80)*** 
0.0155 
(5.83)*** 
0.0154 
(5.75)*** 
RETURN -0.0210 
(-5.33)*** 
-0.0220 
(-5.54)*** 
-0.0230 
(-5.56)*** 
-0.0230 
(-5.76)*** 
QUALITY -0.0045 
(-3.45)*** 
   
ADJ_RES  0.1445 
(4.08)*** 
  
FITQUALITY1   -0.0115 
(-0.74) 
 
FITQUALITY2    0.1587 
(1.49) 
Mean Adj. R2 0.2903 0.2913 0.2912 0.2907 
***, **, * Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level (two-tailed test). The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
RESi,t is equal to the absolute value of the residuals obtained from the following industry regression estimated for each 
year t for each two-digit SIC code: 
ε ++ +β+β+∆β+∆β+∆β+β+α= 1t,it,i6t,i5t,i4t,i3t,i2t,i101t,i OTHERDEPRAPINVARCFOCFO  
 
FQi,t – Financial reporting quality measure:  
 
QUALITY: Indicator variable equal to one if RESi,t < industry median RES. 
 
ADJ_RES: Industry-adjusted RESi,t . 
 
FITQUALITY1: Instrumental variable which is equal to the fitted probabilities obtained from a Probit estimation, 
where the dependent variable is QUALITY. 
 
FITQUALITY2: Instrumental variable which is equal to the fitted value obtained from an OLS regression, where the 
dependent variable is ADJ_RES. 
 
RETURN: the stock return measured from July to June during the one-year period over which the implied cost of 
capital is measured. 
Table 7 reports mean coefficients and corresponding t-statistics (corrected for serial-correlation) from yearly OLS 
regressions. 
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Table 8 
Consequences of Financial Reporting Quality: Association between Firm-Specific 
Cost of Capital and Reporting Quality 
 
ϑρρρρρρρ tititititititie FQGROWTHELEVERAGEMBSIZEBETAR ti ,,,5 6,4,3,2,10 __, +++++++=  
FQ = QUALITY FQ=ADJ_RES FQ=FITQUALITY1 FQ=FITQUALITY2  
 
 
VARIABLE Coefficient (t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
BETA 0.0042 
(2.26)** 
0.0039 
(2.15)** 
0.0036 
(2.05)** 
0.0035 
(1.92)* 
SIZE -0.0390 
(-12.01)*** 
-0.0390 
(-11.65)*** 
-0.0370 
(-14.66) 
-0.0370 
(-14.73)*** 
B_M 0.0216 
(9.16)*** 
0.0216 
(8.85)*** 
0.0200 
(9.59)*** 
0.0202 
(10.06)*** 
LEVERAGE 0.0466 
(6.61)*** 
0.0492 
(6.56)*** 
0.0416 
(5.83)*** 
0.0433 
(6.26)*** 
E_GROWTH 0.0159 
(5.76)*** 
0.0157 
(5.88)*** 
0.0160 
(5.91)*** 
0.0164 
(5.85)*** 
QUALITY -0.0035 
(-2.62)** 
   
ADJ_RES  0.1037 
(2.77)** 
  
FITQUALITY1   -0.030 
(-0.17) 
 
FITQUALITY2    0.0341 
(0.32) 
Mean Adj. R2 0.2756 0.2757 0.2720 0.2725 
 
***, **, * Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level (two-tailed test). The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
RESi,t is equal to the absolute value of the residuals obtained from the following industry regression estimated for each 
year t for each two-digit SIC code: 
ε ++ +β+β+∆β+∆β+∆β+β+α= 1t,it,i6t,i5t,i4t,i3t,i2t,i101t,i OTHERDEPRAPINVARCFOCFO  
 
FQi,t – Financial reporting quality measure:  
 
QUALITY: Indicator variable equal to one if RESi,t < industry median RES. 
 
ADJ_RES: Industry-adjusted RESi,t . 
 
FITQUALITY1: Instrumental variable which is equal to the fitted probabilities obtained from a Probit estimation, 
where the dependent variable is QUALITY. 
 
FITQUALITY2: Instrumental variable which is equal to the fitted value obtained from an OLS regression, where the 
dependent variable is ADJ_RES. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 reports mean coefficients and corresponding t-statistics (corrected for serial-correlation) from yearly OLS 
regressions. This table is similar to Table 6 except that the implied cost of capital is estimated using the stock price as 
of January instead of July 1st. As in Table 6, the implied cost of capital is computed using analyst forecasts as of June. 
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Table 9 
Consequences of Financial Reporting Quality: Association between Bid-Ask 
Spreads and Reporting Quality 
 
ζχχχχχχ tititititititi FQLISTSTDRETVOLUMESIZESPREAD ,5 ,,4,3,21 ,0, +++++= +  
                        
FQ = QUALITY FQ=ADJ_RES FQ=FITQUALITY1 FQ=FITQUALITY2  
 
 
VARIABLE Coefficient (t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
SIZE -0.0170 
(-10.16)*** 
-0.0160 
(-10.25)*** 
-0.0150 
(-9.88)*** 
-0.0010 
(-10.46)*** 
VOLUME -0.020 
(-7.55)*** 
-0.020 
(-7.82)*** 
-0.018 
(-5.67)*** 
-0.019 
(-6.04)*** 
STDRET 0.0969 
(12.60)*** 
0.0956 
(12.10)*** 
0.0918 
(10.62)*** 
0.0903 
(12.14)*** 
LIST 0.0025 
(0.76) 
0.0019 
(0.58) 
-0.0003 
(-0.11) 
-0.001 
(-0.39)*** 
QUALITY -0.0027 
(-1.51) 
   
ADJ_RES  0.0699 
(4.25)*** 
  
FITQUALITY1   -0.0778 
(-2.15)** 
 
FITQUALITY2    0.407 
(4.61)*** 
Mean Adj. R2 0.3312 0.3215 0.3344 0.3405 
                                 
***, **, * Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level (two-tailed test). The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
RESi,t is equal to the absolute value of the residuals obtained from the following industry regression estimated for each 
year t for each two-digit SIC code: 
ε ++ +β+β+∆β+∆β+∆β+β+α= 1t,it,i6t,i5t,i4t,i3t,i2t,i101t,i OTHERDEPRAPINVARCFOCFO  
 
FQi,t – Financial reporting quality measure:  
 
QUALITY: Indicator variable equal to one if RESi,t < industry median RES. 
 
ADJ_RES: Industry-adjusted RESi,t . 
 
FITQUALITY1: Instrumental variable which is equal to the fitted probabilities obtained from a Probit estimation, 
where the dependent variable is QUALITY. 
 
FITQUALITY2: Instrumental variable which is equal to the fitted value obtained from an OLS regression, where the 
dependent variable is ADJ_RES. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 reports mean coefficients and corresponding t-statistics (corrected for serial-correlation) from yearly OLS 
regressions. 
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Table 10 
Consequences of Financial Reporting Quality: Association between Analyst 
Forecast Dispersion and Reporting Quality 
 
                                                  
πλλλλλ titititititi FQANALYSTSURPSIZEDISP ,,4,3,2,10, +++++=              
 
FQ = QUALITY FQ=ADJ_RES FQ=FITQUALITY1 FQ=FITQUALITY2  
 
 
VARIABLE Coefficient (t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
SIZE -0.00007 
(-8.87)*** 
-0.00007 
(-9.27)*** 
-0.00006 
(-1.75) 
-0.00004 
(-1.41) 
SURP 0.0279 
(3.19)*** 
0.0281 
(3.29)*** 
0.0030 
(3.88)*** 
0.0031 
(3.99)*** 
ANALYST -0.003 
(-4.99)*** 
-0.003 
(-3.97)*** 
-0.0023 
(-3.77)*** 
-0.0021 
(-3.52)*** 
QUALITY -0.0429 
(-4.33)*** 
   
ADJ_RES  0.8636 
(2.39)** 
  
FITQUALITY1   -0.1156 
(-3.11)*** 
 
FIRQUALITY2    0.1552 
(2.53)** 
Mean Adj. R2 0.0981 0.0891 0.0860 0.0810 
***, **, * Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level (two-tailed test). The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
RESi,t is equal to the absolute value of the residuals obtained from the following industry regression estimated for each 
year t for each two-digit SIC code: 
ε ++ +β+β+∆β+∆β+∆β+β+α= 1t,it,i6t,i5t,i4t,i3t,i2t,i101t,i OTHERDEPRAPINVARCFOCFO  
 
FQi,t – Financial reporting quality measure:  
 
QUALITY: Indicator variable equal to one if RESi,t < industry median RES. 
 
ADJ_RES: Industry-adjusted RESi,t . 
 
FITQUALITY1: Instrumental variable which is equal to the fitted probabilities obtained from a Probit estimation, 
where the dependent variable is QUALITY. 
 
FITQUALITY2: Instrumental variable which is equal to the fitted value obtained from an OLS regression, where the 
dependent variable is ADJ_RES. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10 reports mean coefficients and corresponding t-statistics (corrected for serial-correlation) from yearly OLS 
regressions. 
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Table 11 
Consequences of Financial Reporting Quality: Association between Analyst 
Following and Reporting Quality 
 
ψϖϖϖϖϖϖ tititititititi FQGROWTHROAEPSSIZEANALYST ,,5,4,3,2,10, ++++++=
                                                               
 
FQ = QUALITY FQ=ADJ_RES FQ=FITQUALITY1 FQ=FITQUALITY2  
 
 
VARIABLE Coefficient (t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
SIZE 0.4078 
(33.66)*** 
0.4060 
(33.67)*** 
0.4124 
(30.36)*** 
0.4143 
(32.37)*** 
EPS -0.046 
(-4.71)*** 
-0.048 
(-5.15)*** 
-0.053 
(-5.41)*** 
-0.059 
(-5.92)*** 
ROA 0.2655 
(2.91)** 
0.4209 
(3.84)*** 
0.4128 
(7.82)*** 
0.759 
(5.65)*** 
GROWTH 0.1199 
(3.67)*** 
0.1272 
(3.74)*** 
0.1723 
(4.14)*** 
0.1308 
(3.85)*** 
QUALITY 0.0052 
(0.40) 
   
ADJ_RES  -0.965 
(-2.76)** 
  
FITQUALITY1   0.6119 
(2.73)** 
 
FITQUALITY2    -6.474 
(-3.62)*** 
Mean Adj. R2 0.3325 0.3421 0.3655 0.3522 
 
***, **, * Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level (two-tailed test). The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
RESi,t is equal to the absolute value of the residuals obtained from the following industry regression estimated for each 
year t for each two-digit SIC code: 
ε ++ +β+β+∆β+∆β+∆β+β+α= 1t,it,i6t,i5t,i4t,i3t,i2t,i101t,i OTHERDEPRAPINVARCFOCFO  
 
FQi,t – Financial reporting quality measure:  
 
QUALITY: Indicator variable equal to one if RESi,t < industry median RES. 
 
ADJ_RES: Industry-adjusted RESi,t . 
 
FITQUALITY1: Instrumental variable which is equal to the fitted probabilities obtained from a Probit estimation, 
where the dependent variable is QUALITY. 
 
FITQUALITY2: Instrumental variable which is equal to the fitted value obtained from an OLS regression, where the 
dependent variable is ADJ_RES. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11 reports mean coefficients and corresponding t-statistics (corrected for serial-correlation) from yearly OLS 
regressions. 
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